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ABSTRACT
Many successful innovative companies are acquired and become absorbed into larger more structured
organizations. The innovation capabilities of the company change in the new environment depending
on the extent to which they are nurtured or overridden. This thesis looks at one particular story of such
an acquisition and follows its progress after it has been formally integrated into the acquiring
company. More than five years after the acquisition the company's innovation is struggling, perhaps
even more so in recent years. This thesis looks at the underlying causes of that struggle, the
inflexibility of the larger more structured organization and the resistance of the acquired company, due
to its earlier success, to adapt itself to the rigours of a larger company,. The thesis strives to answer the
question: "Does early success and market dominance help or hinder future innovative capability?"
The author worked with the acquired company, as a management consultant, for a four year period
beginning shortly after the company was acquired. The culture then, was strikingly positive and very
enjoyable to work in. It had an almost magnetic draw. During the years that followed that culture
began to be eroded and the atmosphere changed palpably as people struggled with the manner in
which new systems and structures were being established. There was constantly a sense of being
imposed on by the parent company rather than being support. That eventually took its toll on people
and in recent years some key employees have left. Having stepped back from the organization, the
author continues to reflect on what could have been done differently along with what can be done
today to retain and restore some of that strong company creativity and innovativeness.
The author's underlying purpose for doing this thesis, in addition to answering the research questions,
is to reaffirm the belief that profitable, successful businesses and strongly held values can and should
coexist.
Thesis Advisor: Michael A. Cusumano
Sloan Management Review Distinguished Professor of Management Thesis Advisor
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis follows the success story of the Canadian AccuMap company and its breakthrough
innovative AccuMap® product, which was acquired by IHS Energy Canada in 2001. From the
research it appears that instead of growing and flourishing following the acquisition and the
consolidation of worldwide development resources into the global Information Technology (IT)
services and systems group, the company's innovative capability has slowed down significantly in
recent years. The purpose of this thesis is to answer the key question: "Does early success and market
dominance help or hinder future innovative capability?"
We look at the story from the perspective of innovation capability, cultural integration leadership
challenges and focus on acquisition. We examine the unique lessons that can be learned from
AccuMap's success to date in a world where technological superiority, market dominance and strong
company culture provide no guarantees without strong leadership and supporting strategies.
Seven core members of the IHS Energy management and senior developer team were
interviewed. Each responded to the key research question and to the relevant areas of the seven
supporting research questions, given in chapter 1. The responses are summarized in chapter 2 to
chapter 8, under the relevant research question title.
Chapter 5 looks at the innovation cycle in terms of system dynamic behavior. The outline
structure used is taken from a lecture on 'Managing through Discontinuities' which was part of the
MIT Sloan 'Technology Strategy' course (Course No. 15.912) taught by Professor Rebecca
Henderson.
Chapter 6 the organization structure is examined using the Organizational Congruence Model to
review responses to thesis question No.6 "What are the barriers to innovation today?"
Chapter 7 looks at the overall thesis question, "Does early success and market dominance help or
hinder future innovative capability?" taking into account the market dominance of IHS Inc as well as
the former AccuMap company.
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions and recommendations on how IHS Inc. can become more
innovative in its bid to be the global standard for enabling the best-in-class decision making processes
in the oil and gas industry.
A literature review was done to help interpret some of the observations made from reviewing the
collective responses. The case studies and research articles which describe challenges similar to those
raised in the interview responses are included in the relevant chapters. It is intended that this brief
literature review will provide additional insight to the reader and help to further interpret some of the
observations made.
CHAPTER 1 - THE APPROACH TO RESEARCH
1.1 COMPANY HISTORY
IHS Inc is a US based company supplying critical information and services to five different industry
sectors. Its annual revenues in 2006 exceeded 0.5 billion dollars. IHS Energy is one of its two main
operating divisions of IHS Inc, along with IHS Engineering. IHS Energy is a leading information and
service provider to the oil and gas exploration and production industry. The company is a global
provider of well and production data as well as economic and consulting services. It supports industry
professionals in over 90 countries in evaluating reserves potential and assessing the economic impact
of political, fiscal and environmental risks. See website for IHS Inc.,.
Historically IHS Energy has been a market leading data service provider rather than an innovation
company, though it leverages the use of the latest technology to deliver world-class integrated
solutions to its customers. IHS Energy strives to be the global standard for enabling the best-in-class
decision making processes in the Oil and Gas (O&G) industry, not only in the traditional exploration
and production sectors but in the transportation and downstream sectors of energy lifecycle. To see the
role which service providers play in the industry, see the industry supply chain in Figure 1.1.
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In 2001 IHS Energy Canada acquired QC Data, along with AccuMap which was known for its
innovation capabilities. AccuMap is a Canadian innovation success story and the product, with over
80% market share, been market leader since 1993.
The AccuMap product, launched in 1991 was a flagship product which changed the way most
exploration companies did business. AccuMap enabled geologists, geophysicists, engineers and land
personnel to do in twenty minutes what used to take six weeks. Its speed and ease of use were
revolutionary and thus it quickly became an integral part of the day to day workflow for exploration
personnel. No other company managed to integrate the speed, functionality and data sets in the way
that AccuMap has done.
In the recent three to five years, however, the innovation capabilities of the combined IHS Energy
and AccuMap companies has slowed down significantly causing great concern to many in the
company. In 2002 IHS Energy began integrating development efforts to replace a number of its legacy
products, and moving many products to a new technology platform. The next generation of AccuMap
was integrated into a new product called Enerdeq. According to the its webpage, , Enerdeq is "A data
access and integration platform - a set of technologies and applications" providing access to all IHS
corporate-wide data. However, despite Enerdeq's launch in 2005 its functionality still falls short of
AccuMap's. Enerdeq, as a full replacement product, is scheduled to be completed by 2008, so as not to
impose an artificial rush on this key transition. Replacement of other legacy products has also stalled.
One could argue that research and development (R&D) is being starved as the parent company,
IHS Inc, is heavily focused on growth through acquiring other companies. Competition is catching up,
as they improve functionality and include wider sets of data. Despite more than four years of effort to
upgrade the platform the next generation products still struggle to quickly replace the full functionality
of the legacy products. The technology problems are not trivial so the opportunity for another
breakthrough use of technology exists. However, competition has not managed to match IHS Energy's
superior content or provide significantly better functionality, such as the provision of a fast and
efficient 'open' data systems allowing customers to integrate their in-house data with IHS Energy
content.
This thesis asks why the global IT services and systems group is not making more progress with
developing the next generation products. What has slowed down its innovative capabilities, given its
consolidation of resources and its history of success in Canada? Why are key development people now
leaving the company in the U.S., U.K. and Canada?
Initially it seemed that the problem was about geographical cultural integration issues and
differing leadership styles following the company mergers but while conducting the research it became
clear that the company's strategy of funding acquisitions through cost cutting in all areas including
research and development (R&D) has significantly impacted the company's ability to innovate
internally.
In September 2006 Jerre Stead, who has held CEO positions in Ingram Micro, Legent and
AT&T's Global Information Solutions (NCR Corporation), took over as CEO for IHS Inc. Given his
charisma and visionary leadership style, his clear and articulate vision of where the company is going
has already created great optimism. R&D funding increased around this time, but it is yet too early to
tell what the full impact of his leadership style will be on innovation at IHS Inc.
In May 2007, during the final stages of writing this thesis, it was announced that IHS Energy
Canada was named amongst the top 50 'Best Workplaces in Canada' by Canadian Business Magazine.
This is a coveted recognition to receive. For many years AccuMap (which became AccuMap
EnerData, then QCData_AccuMap, then IHS AccuMap, then IHS Energy Canada) has been
considered a great place to work. This external recognition confirms this. Clearly the company retains
a culture which is doing a lot of things right in the eyes of its employees, its customers and the
competition judges.
1.2 THE TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
In 2004, as the IHS Energy global IT development team considered how best to protect and grow the
revenue stream coming from existing products, they evolved a technology strategy to reduce the
number of disparate platforms essentially doing the same things. In terms of market strategy a greater
vision was conceived, to create a product which would be the global replacement for the AccuMap and
Probe products and become the definitive cohesive unified energy product platform, capturing the best
of everything and addressing the needs of customers throughout all O&G producing regions. The idea
for the new 'Enerdeq' product was born and the next generation of AccuMap and Probe would be
integrated into it. For a representation of the expected transition in product performance during the
migration to the new technology platform see the 'S- curve' diagram in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2
The S-curve shows the performance of a product over its lifetime. Typically performance dips
when transitioning to a new product due to technology enhancements or other significant changes.
Arguably you should not try to take an S-curve jump if you are missing the following, capabilities,
assets, funding, ability to handle temporary decrease in performance (known as 'Worse Before
Better'), or other entrants are significantly stronger. Best way to assess if you are ready, is to make the
argument fdr not doing it and for getting out of the business entirely. If that argument can't hold then it
is time to attempt the S-curve jump.
IHS Energy clearly has the capabilities to make the s-curve shift but it faces some classic
challenges. The company has to be able to handle the discontinuity and run the two processes in
parallel, side by side for a number of years until it can bring the legacy products to end of life. This is
hugely difficult in the low cost model, which is where IHS Energy is. Limited funding for the old
processes means that work on legacy products is increasingly restricted.
Enerdeq is using existing new technologies to undertake this project platform change. Given the
immense scale of this platform development and the competing need for development resources to
support the legacy products, this project has challenged the company's capacity for innovation. IHS
Energy has struggled to manage the transition to Enerdeq.
Although Enerdeq had a compelling vision and strong support from the development community,
the project didn't seem to take hold in the new global matrixed, more complex organization. The
project stumbled during 2004 and 2005 due to cut backs on expenses as the company prepared to go
public. Even now, though the project is nominally the No. I1 development priority, Enerdeq still
struggles for resources.
The best way to examine the collective impact of various factors on the company strategy is to
select a model for defining strategy. We can visualize the problem using the approach described in
Christensen's 'The Innovator's Solution' in the chapter entitled 'Managing the Strategy Development
Process' . See Figure 1.3. This shows that a company's actual strategy is made up of what the
company intended to do, its 'deliberate strategy', as well as what just happened which is the
unintended or 'emergent strategy'. When both aspects of strategy are combined and take into account
the outcome is the company's actual or strategy, which is significantly impacted by what projects
resources are actually working on. We expand on this discussion again in Chapter 6.
The Process by which Strategy is Defined and Implemented
Improved understanding of
what works and what doesn't
Inanticipated opportunities,
problems and successes
From Clayton M. Christensen, 'The Innovator's Dilemma' -Managing the Strategy Development Process
Figure 1.3
1.3 RESEARCH AND REVIEW METHODS
The review method in this thesis is a descriptive style, interpreting events from AccuMap's history of
innovation and looking at its early success in the context of IHS Energy's innovative capabilities
today. From the key research question below, seven questions were derived. During interviews with
key people from IHS Energy and the former AccuMap these questions were explored. The responses
of the interviewees form a key part of the research and this is reflected in the corresponding chapters.
The names, titles of the seven people interviewed in this research project are given below.
Bob Banks:
Steve Cooper:
Chris Jones:
Ganesh Murdeshwar:
Nancy Maher:
Marc Shandro:
Steven Sypher:
Snr. Software Developer, IHS Energy (Canada) and member original
development team at AccuMap Ltd., Canada.
Snr. Director Strategic Technology & Data Quality, IHS Inc., and former
CTO IHS Energy Ltd, Denver, US.
Snr. VP & General Manager, Canada, IHS Inc., and President, IHS
Energy (Canada) Ltd.
VP Strategic Business Development, IHS Energy (Canada) Ltd. and
former co-founder of AccuMap Ltd., Canada.
Former IT Director, Product Planning IHS Inc, and previously IT
Director, European Programs IHS Energy Group, (Europe).
Former Director Canadian Software Development, IHS Energy (Canada)
Ltd. and former co-founder of AccuMap Ltd., Canada.
Director Production Data Systems IHS Inc., former Director IT, IHS
Energy Ltd., Denver, US.
The thesis research questions were designed originally to focus on three specific business topics,
Innovative Capability, Leadership and Cultural Integration. The issues discussed during interviews
were, however, not limited to these topics. In addition to the seven research questions, more detailed
questions were used to gather supplemental information. A list of these questions are given in
Appendix 1
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Each of the core group of people interviewed was asked to consider the key research question and
the supporting questions which were relevant to his or her role in the company. Detailed sub-questions
were used to guide the discussions where appropriate and compare opinions on specific topics (See
Appendix 1). The responses to questions which are presented in the subsequent chapters are grouped
in order to present the main recurring themes which arose from the research. Interviewee responses to
specific sub-questions are not given.
Key research question
"Does early success and market dominance help or hinder future innovative capability?"
Seven supporting research questions
1. What were the essential components of AccuMap's breakthrough innovation success?
2. How does the legacy of success help or hinder further innovative success?
3. How do leadership styles and values impact a company's ability to create radically innovative
products?
4. What technical and cultural adaptations were needed to integrate the AccuMap product into the
Enerdeq product platform?
5. What lessons has IHS Energy learned in moving from a regional BU controlled software
development function, to global, functionally controlled within a global matrix organization?
6. What are the company's current barriers to innovation (in product development)?
7. How does the company become more innovative and develop more new high quality products
faster?
CHAPTER 2 - WHAT WERE THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF ACCUMAP'S
BREAKTHROUGH INNOVATION SUCCESS?
The responses to thesis question No.2, "What were the essential components of AccuMap's
breakthrough imlovation success?" can be grouped into the following four categories.
1. A visionary founder with a clear vision for the product
2. Optimized use of new technologies
3. Ability to overcome a harsh market slump - by understanding customer adoption behaviour
4. Evidence of early customer interest - through word of mouth marketing
In order to create some context in which these responses can be understood we look briefly at the
company AccuMap and the AccuMap product evolution history.
2.1 THE ACCUMAP COMPANY HISTORY
In 1990 Malcolm conceived of and built the company AccuMap - a company that revolutionized
the Canadian oil and gas industry. Malcolm received recognition within the Canadian oil and gas
business as Entrepreneur of the Year and Calgary City Businessman of the Year and AccuMap itself
was twice a finalist for Alberta's Science and Technology Awards.
Two of the four original co-founders, Ganesh Murdeshwar and Marc Shandro, continue their
involvement within the company, playing key management roles up to today. Marc Shandro's
departure coincides with the inception of this research project, 17 years after his tenure at AccuMap
began.
The AccuMap product enabled geologists, geophysicists, engineers and land personnel to do in
twenty minutes what used to take six weeks. It was the first tool that allowed a great amount of
exploration and production information to be put on an individual's desktop and quickly analyzed. Its
speed and ease of use were revolutionary and thus it quickly became an integral part of the day to day
workflow for exploration personnel.
In 2002 IHS Energy began focusing more attention on developing the next generation of
AccuMap with a number of the original developers from the AccuMap startup. The goal of the new
product, Enerdeq, is to maintain the speed and ease of use of AccuMap Classic while enabling it to
link into multiple public and proprietary data sets, beyond AccuMap's own datasets. Enerdeq was
launched in 2005. It is still building its capability. So as not to impose an artificial rush on customers,
the transition to the full replacement product is scheduled to be complete by 2008. AccuMap is
scheduled to be kept alive until 2011.
The AccuMap company culture remained dominant in IHS Energy Canada for a number of years.
As a result of this values based management style, IHS Energy Canada was named amongst the top
50 'Best Workplaces in Canada' for 2007. This recognition places IHS Energy amongst the top
employers in the big oil town of Calgary where large Canadian and multinationals petroleum firms
have a strong presence and continually battle for top talent. No doubt the company stands to leverage
this success well.
2.2 THE ACCUMAP PRODUCT EVOLUTION HISTORY
In the early 90s analyzing oil and gas exploration data was slow and cumbersome. Geologists
were using old manually intensive processes such as using paper 'PIX' cards (the equivalent of
library cards) to create hand drawn maps. AccuMap was the first application to place this exploration
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data on a pc so that it could be easily viewed and manipulated. According to former employees it was
the first to find the sweet spot of usability for the primary geologists at the time.
Most of the exploration information was on these cards which were filed, one for every well that
was drilled. At that time there were maybe 160,000 to 170,000 wells in the Canadian Western
Sedimentary basin. The geologists would go to the library file cabinet, pick all the cards that are in an
area representing all the wells, look at the cards for the coordinates relative to a section and then draw
it by hand on the well location and then put whatever geologic formation that they were trying to map
next to each well and draw contours by hand on it. It would take them one or two weeks to make one
little 8.5 x 11 'flat map' as it was called.
To replace these hand drawn maps with a dynamic map, the early AccuMap tool used databases
of the Canadian western sedimentary basin, compiled internally in the company, so it was a read only
tool. As they didn't have to have a lot of the extra data base technologies they spent considerable time
compressing the data base to make it possible to synchronize with the fast mapping engine which they
were developing. They wanted an overall fast and seamless sort of browsing capability, to be able to
generate maps very quickly anywhere in that region.
One of the original software developers, Hrvoje Lukatela, came from survey engineering
background and had a personal passion for maps and that passion transferred into building this tool.
He was convinced that the user experience was dramatically affected by how fast you could make a
map on the fly. Hrvoje's focus was on making things extremely fast. To achieve his desired speed he
believed the tool must be connected directly to data without having to preprocess anything. This
required spatial indexing a sophisticated and complex model which retrieves a piece of data which is
location based and places it on model of the earth that can then be mapped. Think of applications like
Google earth. That's what his engine did almost 20 years ago. It used the underling mapping
technology and data indexing technology which he placed in his software. For a more in-depth
description of spatial indexing refer to 'Using a Geodesic Spatial Index to Improve Map Server
Performance' .
What AccuMap did was put the beginning of a map on a pc (personal computer) in front of the
geologists and that was their whole life. They lived and breathed maps. AccuMap gave them a tool to
come up with a map and that was a huge chunk of their work flow right there. From there on it was
very intuitive, you just had to learn a couple of clicks to navigate the map, to zoom in zoom out, to
get well information and so on.
2.3 A VISIONARY FOUNDER WITH A CLEAR VISION FOR THE PRODUCT
Founder James (Jim) Malcolm recognized the commercial opportunity that existed in building a
tool which allowed oil and gas exploration data to be analyzed more quickly and easily by geologists
and other exploration data users. His vision was to create a significantly improved user experience
when it came to creating maps for oil and gas exploration. His vision was so simple and so clear that
all former AccuMap employees were still easily able to describe the vision and relate to their role in
helping to create it.
According to a former employee Malcolm always emphasized listening to the customer and
giving them what they wanted. He recognized the importance of high quality data. He knew that he
had to have strong business associations with data vendors, and if possible, tie them up with exclusive
contracts so the competitors could not get the data. He was seen as "rock solid" when it came to
expressing the high level goals and especially the values of the company, yet he was considered quick
to adapt to changes in partners, data, associates and high level technology.
The early vision for the product was a joint vision with fellow software developer Hrvoje
Lukatela. This vision meant solving a number of tough technology questions. The breakthrough
solution was found using a combination of new technologies, each of which was available at the time.
Malcolm's philosophy was "if we build a quality product, the money will take care of itself." This
belief grew into one of the cornerstones of the AccuMap company culture and it is often repeated by
former AccuMap employees who remain part of IHS Energy today.
The technology details were generally not in Malcolm's purview and according to one developer
"When they were, it was often a mistake.... He had some technological whims that were a little costly
at times." This experience appears to have cultivated a healthy approach of challenging the status quo
when it came to technology decisions.
2.4 OPTIMIZED USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
AccuMap was the first application to place this exploration data on a pc and its increase in speed
represented a quantum leap compared to other offerings. Although there were other pc solutions
before AccuMap it captured and maintained first mover advantage because no-one came close to
matching its speed, even today. Back in 1991 the competition tended to have project based maps, not
dynamic maps. Users had to select the area using option menus, go to the next level, choose further
options and so on to download an area and then wait 20 minutes for the map to be displayed. It could
display a map of any area in real time, say 5 seconds. The AccuMap application was a radical
improvement over existing manual processes.
Although none of the technology was new, the breakthrough came from the combination of
different aspects of product enhancements which was seen by many as "a winning combination for
customers".
* Usability - Ease of use of the product was one of the top priorities. In terms of simplicity it was
ahead of its time. There wasn't any moment of brilliant insight that said ease of use will win the
day but Malcolm passionately believed in this approach and it was really emphasized among
developers. The interface was sort of a graphical user interface (GUI) and this meant it was easy
to make a map and inspect a well. None of the competition at that time had that approach. Nearly
everyone uses it now.
* Speed - AccuMap utilized various software tools that were vastly superior to their competitors in
terms of speed, in particular the Spatial Engine software. The fast data access was then built on
top of the user interface and the functionality. It was like their own data base build. The overall
application speed was orders of magnitude greater than other applications, especially broad
regional queries.
* Data compression - a variety of techniques were used to compress AccuMap's data set to a
significantly smaller size than its competitor. This allowed developers to fit more data on smaller
hard-drives. The smaller size resulted in faster install times and increased product performance
during runtime benchmarking.
* Media - AccuMap was the first product to use CD's as a delivery mechanism. This is
commonplace now, but at the time it allowed the company to deliver more data faster and easier.
* Development tools - we used more powerful programming languages and tools that allowed us
not only build code in shorter time, but most importantly, allowed us to relatively quickly
enhance the code based on user requests. It's also felt we had fewer bugs.
* Ease of deployment; the software and data were tightly integrated. The spatial engine and the
GUI were the two home grown technologies in AccuMap. Either technology alone would not
have been enough to distinguish the product. The technology success came from embedding the
spatial engine software into the compressed data sets within AccuMap. The tight integration
meant the application was easy to deploy.
* Integration of essential data in one place which overtime locked customers into use of the tool.
The fact that pc's were becoming ubiquitous played a large part in how AccuMap optimized the
use of technology at the time. Geologists using AccuMap had a desktop mapping tool that could
build a map on the fly. Once the map had been drawn, it could be moved in 5 sec, without
creating a new project. Using the old project based systems, if geologists wanted high quality
maps they called the mapping bureau and ordered it with various layers showing. The mapping
bureau then loaded a Computer Aided Design (CAD) tool with the requested layers. The pc
allowed desktop mapping, which worked in seconds and was as accurate as CAD. Geologists had
AccuMap for the cost of twenty CAD maps.
Developers seemed to have learned early on that the most significant mistake in a start-up is to be
too concerned with creating a breakthrough in technology. That alone doesn't create value. One of
their development philosophies was "put as much in as you need to solve the problem and no more".
The company became successful when it used the technology to create a process for end user, thus
they found a way of turning it into value for the customer.
With a reduction in process time from 20 minutes to 5 seconds detailed benchmarking didn't
matter. In the early AccuMap days ad-hoc benchmark proved to be more than adequate. Developers
were able to see competitive products in action at install sights and could visually gauge product
performance, e.g. map drawing speed, query speed etc. When it came to usability, customers told
AccuMap developers what was bad in the competitors' products and developers built it better. There
was no strict quantitative measurement of usability other than informal feedback, plus the survey
results from hundreds of users, based on questionnaires handed out at open houses and trade shows.
2.5 ABILITY TO OVERCOME A HARSH MARKET SLUMP - BY UNDERSTANDING
CUSTOMER ADOPTION BEHAVIOUR
AccuMap was the first product on the market to provide clear advantages for geologists and other
users in terms of speed and usability, yet it was two to three years before sales took off. The
company AccuMap was "the new kid on the block" and they were "taking on the big dogs" in the
Canadian oil and gas services business. They had to clearly distinguish themselves in the eyes of the
customer.
Thus the AccuMap early team had many challenges to overcome in terms of customer adoption
and a harsh market slump. One overriding reason for the slow uptake of AccuMap was in 1991 the
Oil Patch was in a slump similar to the Silicon Valley of 2004. AccuMap was launched in a major
market downturn. It was post National Energy Program (NEP) days, a program introduced in 1980
which destroyed Canada's Oil Patch. For more details on The NEP see on-line discussion forum
related to 'Developing Alberta's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto' . Commodity prices had
come down and at the same time costs were sky high. Alberta was at end of this ten year post NEC
cycle and large oil companies were laying off thousands of people.
As a result of harsh financial environment geologists, even the early adopters who saw an
immediate need for it couldn't buy AccuMap unless it replaced something else in their budget.
Addressing this constraint was one of the main challenges that made AccuMap so successful.
AccuMap was not a strategic imperative, so instead of developing an aggressive sales approach, the
sales people and developers listened very closely to customers.
According to one of the original AccuMap developers, "The product was so radically improved
over existing manual processes, and the industry so entrenched with computer illiterate elder
statesmen, that it was sometimes hard to convince potential customers that our product would save
them vast amounts of time. Once convinced, we had to overcome hurdles such as teaching users how
to work a mouse. We even had users phoning in asking why the product doesn't show up on their
screen, when the answer was simply "turn on your PC". Other difficulties were luddites and tree
killers who clung to old produces such as paper "PIX" cards, hand drawn maps etc. Other difficulties
were the fact that our data partner also sold competitive "PIX" cards, the old technology, so their
products were fighting each other."
According to one former employee people immediately saw its value. However, even though the
AccuMap application was so much more convenient, it wasn't enough because geologists needed all
the information on a well to create a picture of what is happening. One customer might say "The
application is great but we need to add our tops data ('tops' refers to the top of a geological
subsurface formation). Another might say "Yeah great, but we can't replace (the existing system)
unless we add production data". From there a customer might say "Yeah that's great but I can't get
rid of all my (Pix) cards for Tops. We have government data there but if we can put our data it would
be much better". So developers loaded their tops data. Then developers added land data and so on.
Each customer had some unique needs. Many companies needed their own critical data sets
included in the database. This was often managed by finding the source of the data, getting into a
partnership and then putting all the data into AccuMap. It was sort of orchestrated adding of data sets,
one at a time. As developers fleshed out the different data sets it becomes more of a complete offering
so that users didn't have to go to all these different systems to get data like pipeline data, gas analysis,
pressure data, core data, production data or land data.
Developers assessed what priority to give the customer requests and fed it back into development
cycle right away. Sticking points were immediately addressed such as getting printing capability for
large plotters. Thus they had created an immediate feedback loop between sales and developers. The
first version of AccuMap was fairly basic, all it had was wells grid but it still legitimately looked like
a map. Through the summer of 1991 the developers built the product according to what was going to
get one customer to fully adopt the product. Knowing every detail of what it took to get a customer on
board created an application that became the market leader for over a decade.
Another developer recalls their close links with customers. "We were doing customer support, so
if we put in something difficult to use we had to take phone calls. We built it so that no-one has to ask
questions as to how it is used. If we ship out a feature that was unclear we are suddenly in a negative
reinforcing loop, 'boom', the next day we are swamped with calls."
Service companies were also feeling the massive pinch of the "glory days" being gone. While
some were like the phoenix rising from the ashes, most were still hurting. It was about survival so it's
safe to say their products had been static for a while. AccuMap's approach was revolutionary. It
combined the use of new technologies such as digital data, map based interface and new CD media
for sending out monthly digital updates amongst other things.
2.6 EVIDENCE OF EARLY CUSTOMER INTEREST - THROUGH WORD OF MOUTH
MARKETING
The oil and gas industry in Canada is a very tight knit industry with almost everyone working
down town in Calgary. Jim Malcolm's approach to marketing was to have a well respected and well
connected geologist friend start introducing AccuMap while he was doing his geology work to thus
get it into a few places. Through this initial sales process, they got some key installs and did demos
in about a hundred companies within the first year. Word of mouth really helped a lot in finding other
early adopters. When people had it they really raved about how much easier it was for them to use
compared to manual maps.
Although it had first mover advantage with respect to providing application which was a quantum
leap ahead of its competitors in terms of speed and ease of use, it was still the new kid on the block.
For that reason throughout this time Jim Malcolm felt he should target sales at small companies and
the company concentrated on that market. However, developers continued to pay close attention the
needs of the bigger customers,. such as Renaissance and Pan Canadian knowing that if they could sell
to them it would be a real vote of approval from a leader in the industry.
Suddenly, in December 1991 Pan Canadian one of the biggest local oil companies at that time
said "This is great, we want unlimited licenses." This took AccuMap from being a startup to being a
major player. It was a classic moment of"Crossing the Chasm", where the company finally begins to
sell its product or service to "the early majority" of customers. Although it had taken a while for the
momentum kick in, with 2-3 years of its launch AccuMap sales really hit the hockey stick inflection
point.
While the eventual sales growth came relatively quickly it was still longer than originally
anticipated by the company founders. During the early years there were also capital management
challenges because of over optimism in the product. The company didn't have enough cash to survive
as long as it needed to. It took longer than one or two years for sales to break even. Malcolm went
back to investors, many of whom were family and friends. He didn't have to work really hard to show
them the niche market potential in order to bring in additional finances and he still had full control
over the vision and direction of the company. Malcolm had originally envisioned an exit strategy, to
sell to partners after two years. That didn't happen in '94/'95, because of the fun and success they
were enjoying.
2.7 LESSONS FROM LITERATURE
In 'The Business of Software', Free Press 2004, Michael A. Cusumano provides an eight point
list of 'Essential Elements of a Successful Start-up' . Not surprisingly this list maps well onto the
elements that contributed to AccuMap's early success, listed at the start of this chapter. Not only are
these elements common among successful software start-ups, they highlight the skills that team
members developed collectively, skills which should be fully leveraged in the global matrixed
organization if the company wishes to remain or become more innovative.
1. A Strong Management Team
2. An Attractive Market
3. A Compelling New Product, Service Or Hybrid Solution
4. Strong Evidence Of Customer Interest
5. A Plan To Overcome The Credibility Gap
6. A Business Model Showing Early Growth And Profit Potential
7. Flexibility In Strategy And Product Offerings
8. The Potential For Large Payoff To Investors
While it is common to find 5/8 or 6/8 attributes present in a group or company, what
differentiates the successful company is having all eight elements present. A number of the elements
which contributed strongly to AccuMap's product development breakthrough success are still
relevant in the larger matrixed global organization of IHS Inc. today. These elements are summarized
below with the element they correspond to from the list above.
* Having a visionary leader, who clearly communicates and doesn't change his mind on the big
picture goals. (Element No. 1 - A Strong Management Team)
* Listening to the customer, focus on quality and lock in your key data vendors or partners.
(Element No.3 - A Compelling New product, Service, or Hybrid Solution)
* Understand the constraints of the early product adopters and work tirelessly to overcome
these constraints. (Element No.7 - Flexibility in strategy and product offerings)
Some of these elements or attributes are missing today or gaps exist in the company's ability to
carry them out effectively. Here we consider some of the points taken from Cusumano's discussion
on 'What to look for in a software start-up'. The references to CEO, founder or entrepreneurs are
considered relevant to the managers, developers and other stakeholders involved in the global IT
group at IHS Inc.
"Founders who want to become CEOs need to develop management skills, such as listening to
others without being overly intimidating, accepting different points of view as objectively as
possible, deciding how to allocate resources (people, time and money), and avoid what I call "panic
management." The last item refers to the tendency of novice managers to respond to the latest crisis
each day and lose track of the bigger picture."
"Some software entrepreneurs are more deliberate than others in how they go about finding that
compelling product concept. They may have a deep familiarity with a particular technology and then
spend some time analyzing the market space before they identify a customer need that remains
unfilled or poorly met. Bill Gates and Paul Allen did this with Microsoft when they identified the
need for programming languages for PCs. Jim Clark and Marc Andreessen did it with Netscape when
they identified the need for commercial-grade Internet browsers and servers. Bernard Liautaud and
Denis Payre did it with Business Objects when they identified the need for simple data base analysis,
query, and reporting tools that ran on personal computers and targeted non-expert users. Sanjiv Sidhu
and Ken Sharma did it with i2 Technologies when they identified the need for better factory and
supply-chain planning systems and found a way to package their unique optimization algorithms."
"One way of evaluating strategic flexibility is to talk to the founder and the management team,
and try to understand how they think about different options and how rigid their personalities are.
You have to make guesses about people. The flexibility of the technology or product is often easier
to evaluate objectively. For example, you might want to know how tight the code is tied to a
particular platform and programming interfaces or how generalizable the architecture or functionality
is. Has the team thought about what else could be done with the technology it is building and the
technical skills it is cultivating?"
These quotes are included for the consideration of those seeking to create a more highly
innovative environment at IHS Inc today. It is my opinion from conducting this research that
innovative success depends on the above gaps being addressed.
CHAPTER 3 - HOW DO LEADERSHIP STYLES AND VALUES IMPACT A
COMPANY'S ABILITY TO CREATE RADICALLY INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS?
The leadership styles and values at IHS have changed a lot as the company has had three CEOs in
five years. While all people interviewed agreed that different situations require different leadership
styles and attributes, it is clear that the styles and values that existed in the past five years at the top
leadership level were seen as not actively promoting innovation in the company, until changes
occurred in late 2006. The question is what impact have the various leadership attributes had on
innovation in the company and how is the emerging new leadership style impacting the organizations
ability to innovate going forward? Responses to research question #3 have been grouped into five
categories listed below. Before describing the styles and values we look at the leadership changes
that have taken place in IHS Inc and IHS Energy in recent years.
* Leadership vision
* Leadership risk taking and empowerment
* Leadership discipline
* Leadership integrity and communication
* Leadership decisiveness and support
3.1 CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP
Change in leadership is not just inevitable it is essential at different times for different reasons.
Under CEO Bob Carpenter (2000 to 2004), 'the Carpenter era' as it is referred to, the company
demonstrated its ability to focus on finance and radically reduce costs. Carpenter's focus on the
company's finances using his iron disciplined style was consistent with his goal of preparing the
company for its IPO. Carpenter was seen by some as the right guy at the right time. He created the
much needed discipline on expenses, which helped position the company for growth.
Following the four year Carpenter era, Charles Picasso took over as CEO in October 2004 to
September 2006 when he retired. Picasso continued the strong focus on finances as he lead IHS
through its successful initial public offering in November 2005. Under his leadership the company
continued to grow steadily, primarily through strategic acquisitions.
As Picasso prepared to retire in September 2006, Jerre L. Stead, who had served as executive
chairman of IHS since December 2000, became CEO. People agree that this newly public company
needs someone with a clear vision, who is good at articulating vision and motivating people to grow
and develop the company. Stead appears to be that visionary leader that people were hoping for.
Each of the core group of interviewees has high expectations of Stead. He has a strong, charismatic
personality and his proven track record of leading successful organizations has been widely
publicized. For more details on Jerre Stead becoming CEO, see the IHS Inc. website . Despite the
break in continuity that comes with yet another new leader optimism is very high.
Here we look at the company's ability to create radically innovative products. When IHS Energy
acquired the Canadian company AccuMap in 2000 it acquired a highly successful innovative
development team, with a proven track record of bringing innovative products onto the Canadian
market. In 2003 that development group, which had known a decade of success as an independent
group under local Canadian leadership was merged with the newly formed worldwide IT
development group based in Denver and the development group in the U.K.
One commonly understood goal of the worldwide IT services and systems group is to protect the
revenue stream through consolidating products and creating the next generation of highly innovative
products to replace the current aging ones. When looking at the leadership styles necessary to help
create innovative products in the company, strongly different views emerged on what role innovation
plays in IHS Energy. People hold different views on what attributes a leader needs in order to
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manage innovation. There are also widely different views on which leadership attributes are relevant
today.
The one thing everyone agreed on is that there have been many delays in bringing Enerdeq to
market and time is running out, as the legacy products are barely supported. Significant work still
has to be done to complete the effective integration of the development groups which began in 2003.
3.2 LEADERSHIP VISION
The first agreed leadership attribute, is the need for a clear vision of where you want your new
technology to be. A leader ensures that the group never looses sight of that vision and the end goal.
According to all those who had been part of a successful innovation team for more than a decade the
leader's vision, the values and the high level goals should be kept as constant as possible. The leader
needs to understand the future technological changes and create a clear picture of how the company
is going to respond to those changes. The vision must take into account the tradeoffs that will be
necessary, particularly where you have a high number of revenue generating legacy products.
Leadership has to be able to communicate this vision to all customers, explaining clearly why there
is a technology shift.
Some feel that to keep the ability to innovate really alive in the company, developers really need
to know what customers are doing everyday. The leader has to create a strong vision of a bold step
forward, such as taking a customer task that currently takes hundreds of hours and figuring out how
to do it in tens of hours. With that kind of vision the developers can tackle and solve the tough
technology problems. Without that kind of bold vision, some believe breakthrough innovation won't
occur within the company.
According to others, in order to foster new innovations within the company the leader needs to
understand the life cycle, including 'Crossing the Chasm.' This refers to the work by Geoffrey A.
Moore on marketing and selling high-tech products to mainstream customers. According to those
interviewed the leader needs to understand the importance of finding early adopters, finding where
you are in that cycle and where your customers are in their adopting behaviors. IHS Energy has to
replace AccuMap by starting with the customers whose adoption behaviors are fully understood. The
leader needs courage, resources, money and people. There is a belief that IHS Energy hasn't done
this well so far. Some feel it is because the company hadn't the ability to carve out or to fuel R&D
work. The purpose of investments has always been to generate short term revenue, within a known
framework as opposed to an unknown one. In order to innovate there is a need to explore. IHS never
had that (exploring) culture.
The early decisions around the replacement of AccuMap give an example of this type of
exploration. Replacing AccuMap began to be considered as far back as 1999, prior to its acquisition
by IHS but at that time no clear plan had emerged. As the company began to resource the project in
2000 it headed down a specific technical path. In 2002, due to changes in the market and technical
limitations of the chosen software, the company stopped its then technology choice and decided to
develop the next platform using .NET and C-sharp. Those technology decisions remain in place
today.
In 2003 when it came to integration of the development teams into a worldwide IT group the
leadership vision needed to include how to bring the teams together and how to shift the groups
towards a more global view. Most of the core group of interviewees, listed in Chapter 1, agreed that
there has been lack of clarity and motivation around global goals. This has resulted in lack of focus
on resource related issues, particularly when it comes to innovation. However, all agreed that Stead,
the new CEO, provides clarity and motivation around his vision for IHS where customers are
number one and people are the most important asset. Many see that with his vision and ability to
motivate he can shift people towards taking a more global view of where the company is going. As
one person put it "with Stead the talk is good, now it's a case of walking it."
In 2007 strategic plans from the executive leadership have being radically adjusted to promote a
more global view in all regions. Up to 2007 implementing such global plans hadn't been successful
because management teams' incentives were focused on growing profitability in the regions. Most
agree that one of the biggest issues, from a management and leadership perspective is that to act
globally the company has to create globally focused incentives which are aligned with the leadership
vision. A number of managers feel that they have struggled to effectively integrate matrixed groups
in the global organization and they believe they would benefit from a better understanding of how
this global view fits in with regional processes so that they can make more informed decisions when
setting priorities.
Most of those interviewed believe that the leader's vision needs to clarify how the demand for
short term growth in this newly public traded company is going to be balanced with achieving longer
term product development goals in the cost cutting environment. The company's goal is to keep
costs down while adding to the top line, but growth is constrained by the need to add acquisitions or
grow internally while keeping margins bigger than the current margin level, which, in Canada is
close to 50%. At the same time the company is at risk of loosing revenue to competitors within two
years if customers drop existing products, because replacement products don't have full
functionality. This year's focus on Enerdeq as the number one development priority is the first step
in addressing this challenge.
3.3 LEADERSHIP RISK TAKING AND EMPOWERMENT
There is fairly widely held view that the leadership needs to take more risk in empowering
employees. Tied to that need for empowerment some see the critical need for leadership
development programs, which the company has just begun to roll out. According to one senior
member of management; "At different levels of leadership we ask people to step up and then step up
another level in more of a global context. We make assumptions that they can." Senior members of
management see the company's leadership development programs as absolutely essential to help
people develop the skills they needed to do the jobs that are being asked of them.
Some see that a company's ability to innovation requires leaders who promote constant learning
and a sense of exploration among developers and related groups. The leader must have the ability to
trust employees and an example of that trust is to leave the core technology decisions to those that
know it, namely the developers. On the other hand the developer needs to recognize that exploration
and risk taking should not include technical advances which are so new that they introduce
uncertainty and unknowns into products which replace a highly stable product suite. Leadership
focus on education of employees is considered critical to a company's ability to produce highly
innovative products.
While some employees believe that IHS Energy has allowed developers to make many of the core
technology decisions, most feel that overall the leadership lacks trust in its employees. Some
executive leaders still use a command and control style or a dogmatic or dictatorial approach. Some
employees feel sheltered from this style of executive leadership by their immediate supervisors but
most agree that it drains resources, creates turnover and ultimately leads to delays in development
and weakens the company's ability to create strong innovative products.
Most of the interviewees agreed that a company's ability to innovate requires the software
developers to be closely linked to the customers. Today the company's product managers represent
not only the voice of the customers but that of the competition as well. Many believe that the fewer
people in between customers and developers the better and thus the key to success lies in how well
the product manager and developers collaborate and work together. Most agree that the gap between
them needs to be narrowed. Visible leadership support is essential given that many product managers
now operate on a global basis, with functional as well as business units and some are struggling with
different markets and different products.
Some believe that product managers haven't always been equipped to make decisions, for
example if a customer segment started to drop the product, the product managers might not have
access to the support they need to quickly address the problem. The role of leader is critical in
keeping everyone sharply focused on these issues. In the recent integration the leadership admittedly
did not focus adequately on this area. This has changed and in recent months. Leaders have begun to
engage all stakeholders more extensively so that early warning flags are raised they can respond
quickly.
3.4 LEADERSHIP DISCIPLINE
Opinions vary strongly as to the need for strong discipline. Most agree that when leading
innovation in an established company with market leading legacy products it's harder and more
complicated to make a technology jump compared to being the new kid on block. The leader has to
know how to maintain market share with the high number of legacy products in order to stay
profitable. At some point you will not have the skill set to support the product or the software won't
be available to continue to maintain the product. The leader needs to have an exit path for current
products which internal people understand, especially when you are the market leader with a
dominant market share. This closely connects to the need for the leader to clearly communicate this
vision for the technology shift to all customers.
A leader is seen as someone "who explains the vision and then puts the right people in the right
place to make it happen". All agree that a leader needs to validate how his or her vision is being
implemented. This needs to be done, not just in terms of numbers, but in terms of other deliverables
too. There are widely differing opinions as to what the other deliverables should be and how they
should be validated. Some feel that key performance metrics are important and development can't
take place without them. Some argue that there is no real difference between the leadership
approaches required for leading a pioneering technology change versus managing a sustaining
operation as all critical goals have to be accurately measured so the leader knows what has been
done and where the group is against stated goals. Others argued strongly that overemphasis on
operation style, measurement and adherence to schedule did not allow for any creativity or
innovation.
According to one interviewee "If you take on technology or innovation projects you have to set
hard and fast deadlines, with a deliverable that you can actually feel and say yes it's been met, or no
it has not. From that perspective software technology is not any different from operations or services
either... If you go with a technology project are you meeting deadlines, are you delivering what you
promised when you promised and at the price you promised? It's about breaking it down into
manageable pieces, particularly with software. Every task can be reported as on time or on target and
then, as happens so many times, it is all blows up a week before scheduled product delivery.
Suddenly you find half the stuff hasn't been done. The problems boil down to not being able to
adequately measure what was done."
Others take the opposing view that you can't build highly innovative products which customers
really love on a fixed schedule and a fixed budget. These are seen to be mutually exclusive. In fact
some go so far as to say that imposing a project framework on product innovation, with budgets and
schedules and rigid parameters is heresy. Some argue that this is a product not a project and it has no
fixed end, you can evolve it forever. The only budget for the development should be a maximum
spend budget along with the corresponding set revenue expectation. Success should be defined by
customer satisfaction, which translates to financial success. If leaders consistently use operational
type metrics to monitor development,.they place too much emphasis on deadlines and budgets and
don't allow for exploration or organizing and building innovative products organically based on a
high level of continued customer interaction. This view was echoed by other developers who felt that
the company won't make money on innovation by "saving a buck on the budget" Innovation requires
the idea of spending money to make money.
Leadership focus on process monitoring, performance increase and cost control are considered to
be more critical when a company is sustaining its technology advantage. There are individuals who
believe that the leader needs to focus on controlling cost when it comes to sustaining technology
advantage. According to one interviewee "That becomes the tight rope the company has to walk
across. When you have legacy product that evolves into a new technology the leader doesn't want to
segregate groups, to pigeon hole teams working on the old technology and marketing efforts, and
bring a whole new set of skills to take the new technology forward". This is seen to require good
public relations to ensure that everyone has career opportunities internally. "The leader has to find
the right mix, of those comfortable to step up to new technology and also to find those who are very
comfortable maintaining the old. It comes down to knowing your staff well."
According to one member of senior management "You need to stay aware of competition, in two
ways, firstly on product features, and secondly on business strategy (which trumps product features).
There is no room for complacency. It is generally felt that IHS Energy has put a lot of focus on this
and has done reasonably well. Everything is really important including getting the red flags as a
leader. Something may be seen as obvious on the ground but you want the bad news, the warning
flags and you want to get them early. This can be seen as a cultural issue where communication is
key."
3.5 LEADERSHIP INTEGRITY AND COMMUNICATION
Integrity is a leadership attribute that is expected in all businesses. Some feel that IHS has gone
through stages in the past where this integrity may have been lacking, or at least the communication
wasn't adequate to convey a sense of integrity throughout the organization. In the past there wasn't a
sense that people were all focused on the same objective. It came down to lack of consistent
communication, which was perceived as lack of integrity. People were not always sure that the same
message was being given in different places and it was widely agreed that this resulted in a lot of
confusion and ultimately bad feelings. This commonly held perception made it a lot more difficult to
work together towards creating unified and innovative products for the customers.
According to one interviewee, there are three components to consider when integrating an
organization. The first component is a well defined organizational structure, the second component is
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and the third is ability to effectively communication. The
third component is so fundamental that it can compensate for lack of effectiveness in the other two
components. The organization structure should be irrelevant in a way, but clearly defining roles and
responsibilities is always important. This aspect was very challenging when IHS transitioned from
regional business units to a matrixed organization.
Overall interviewees believe that as a whole transition didn't go that well. Everyone agreed that
the leadership needed to pay more attention to understand and accommodate the differences in
culture, particularly geographical cultural differences which became amplified within the integrated
groups. There was no clear model to follow when integrating the team and the company needed
someone sensitive to work through the issues. The cultural issues were never really resolved. For
example,- when management of the software development group based in Calgary was transferred to
Denver, the Canadian executives had to trust the corporation to look after all aspects software
development and avoid judging what was happening, from both a technical and a management
perspective. The problems were no longer theirs to fix. It was a very challenging time and, according
to one senior member of management, it required a lot of personal adjusting for those involved.
3.6 LEADERSHIP DECISIVENESS AND SUPPORT
In order for the merged development to focus on a common objective the leader needs to decide
what the group is doing and how it is going to do it. The need for decisiveness follows on from
having clarity around vision and strategy. Rather than letting things evolve, the leader, it is believed,
should make the tough decisions, makes them early and articulates them clearly. Tough decisions
include ones like finding funding and resources for a new product, getting rid of a product or a team,
or facing down resistance to an already agreed upon organizational or structural change.
Taking the tough high level decision is considered one of the main attributes of a strong leader
and it clears the way for groups to focus their work, which in this case is innovation. People agreed
that there was a lot of early resistance to the change and there were no repercussions where there was
resistance. A decision needed to be made to address the resistance along with acknowledging and
fixing the underlying cause of the resistance, which mostly related to cultural differences in how
things were done.
The development group in Canada had always been very closely connected to and actively
supported by the leader. Innovation and product development had been the sole focus of the former
AccuMap company thus the Canadian developers had always enjoyed high visibility within the local
organization. Meeting their needs was a priority with their leaders. In contrast the development
group in Denver was one of many groups co-located within the corporate headquarters. As such they
did not enjoy the same visibility with the company's leadership, despite being close to them
geographically. Leadership support for development work, particularly from CEO level, was usually
difficult to get, because traditionally development work at IHS lacked the strategic importance
compared to acquisition activities.
From the interviews it is not clear how strategically important product development work is at
IHS Energy. Finding resources for a new development project such as Enerdeq has been difficult.
Some feel that decisions about assigning resources to build Enerdeq seem to have been made
organically at some arbitrary management level. The evolved decision appears to be to complete
building an early version of the Enerdeq and get it to market as soon as possible with the minimal
number of resources possible. Under-resourcing the new product, launching it when it is far from a
replacement product and arguably under-resourcing the legacy products too left the development
groups with extra challenges as this greatly extends the transition time. It appears that the decision
was never explicitly made or that no one has particularly thought it through. Perhaps it is because of
changes in leadership that the decision arose organically or perhaps despite the cash available for
acquisitions, the company was not willing to direct the necessary funding to R&D.
One interviewee felt strongly that the way to decide where resources needed to be placed when
transitioning from old to new products was to pay more attention to competition and customers. "If
you do that you know exactly what money and resources to place, where, and especially when."
This means that leadership support for the product managers and others who represent the voice of
the customer is critical to a company's ability to develop highly innovate products. In Chapter 6 we
expand on this discussion, looking at how the product reflects the actual company development
strategy.
A number of those interviewed seemed to have responsibility without real decision making
authority when it came to overcoming integrating challenges. Support from more senior management
was not visible and strongly differing opinions resulted in clashes which became unnecessarily
personalized over time. In these cases strong, visible and decisive leadership was required. People
wanted a leader who would say "look guys this is what we have to do...now let's figure out how we
are going to do it". A culture of conflict can be constructive if it is accompanied by trust. In Chapter
6 we expand on this idea in discussing how to create an organizational structure to support
innovation.
3.7 SUMMARY
From the responses detailed above the following list summarizes, in no particular order, what
interviewees considered to be the most important leadership styles and values, which impact a
company's ability to create radically innovative products. There are a number of recurring themes in
this list and these issues are reviewed further in Chapter 6.
* Set and articulate a clear vision
* Align incentives to top objectives
* Guide functional management in aligning short term cost controls and long term strategy
* Set up monitoring with flexibility
* Communicate frequently and openly
* Empower employees
* Ensure high level of responsiveness to customer and competition
CHAPTER 4 - WHAT TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL ADAPTATIONS WERE
NEEDED TO INTEGRATE THE ACCUMAP PRODUCT INTO THE ENERDEQ
PRODUCT PLATFORM?
4.1 GOALS OF GLOBAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT GROUP
In order to figure out what technical and cultural adaptations were needed in the organization
beginning back in 2004, it is important to look at the goals that were set by the executive team at that
time
Everyone agreed that one of the major goals of the integration was to protect existing revenue
stream. People seemed to be clearly focused on that. A related goal was to replace the AccuMap
product with a new product within a three year timeframe. According to one interviewee "One of the
advantages with redeveloping a new platform is that you know what you've got to develop". Another
interviewee said they began the project with a broad idea of what they were going to do but without a
clear plan of how they were going to do it. There was general agreement that there would be
technology alignment between different groups where possible. The company appeared to struggle
with that alignment perhaps because of lack of clear goal setting at a tactical level.
However, there was a sense that all regional VPs as well as leaders of the worldwide IT services
and systems group were involved in the decision to build the Enerdeq product platform. Supposedly
they all understood the costs and how much of the resources were going to be diverted to accomplish
it. Those interviewed from the US office believed that the regional business unit in Canada stayed
more closely connected to the evolving goals of the global IT group than other regional counterparts
in the U.S. and Europe. The Canadian leadership team appeared to know what was happening. Yet
the Canadian management felt quite removed from what was happening relative to their previous
level of involvement.
Another commonly understood goal was that of completing acquisitions. IHS has always had an
active strategy of acquiring companies to support its global growth plan. This strategy is well funded
and it is seen as the #1 company priority. The cost cutting of 2003 and 2004 was seen as a necessary
part of funding these acquisitions, in order to maintain growth.
In 2004 the company had begun planning its IPO and it set ambitious global goals for this. Many
people felt there was lack of clarity on how these global goals would be achieved. Some felt that
there was significant conflict in terms of global versus local goals as differences in possible
strategies appeared to exist. For example, once the matrix organization was put in place there was no
clear alignment between business unit goals and the then worldwide software development goals. It
became a question of balancing resources for AccuMap versus resources for new products, which
was a challenge, even for the strongly allied Canadian leadership team.
There is general agreement that in 2004 these development goals were not as visible or as well
understood at CEO level as they could have been. At the time Carpenter's focus was very much on
finances as it needed to be in pre IPO days. Development felt it was supported but it did not seem to
get visibility up through the organization when it came to making tough investment decisions. The
development vision seemed to start in the middle of the organization, spawning out of ideas at the
regional VP level. This is a perfect example of 'emergent strategy' as described in chapter one and
represented in Figure 3.
The Enerdeq development project seemed to stumble in 2004 and 2005 due to lack of proper
funding as the company cut back heavily on expenses in order to get ready to go public. There were
two or three changes of software development leadership, each which created its own set of goals,
but no unifying vision emerged.
In August 2006, things suddenly began to look more positive again. The early customer revenue
from the newly released Enerdeq demonstrated success and attracted interest of the company
executives. With this new found visibility the development of Enerdeq became the #1 development
priority for IHS Energy and project funding has increased significantly. Given this change and the
arrival of the new CEO Stead, people feel things are definitely heading in the right direction.
However, some consider that twice as much funding and resources are required to get the complete
replacement product launched because there isn't much time left as the older products are being
barely kept alive. This is looked at again later when considering the transition strategy in Chapter 7.
4.2 THE TECHNICAL ADAPTATIONS
The need for integrating AccuMap and Enerdeq arose because there were multiple disparate
platforms that essentially did the same things. When the idea of Enerdeq was born in 2004 there was
a global vision around what this new product could be, the global replacement for Probe and
AccuMap and a wonderful cohesive unified energy product platform, the best of everything. The
vision for Enerdeq was that it would enable the following integrations of products and services in
addition to maintaining the traditional functionality of AccuMap and ProbETM desktop products.
* Enerdeq Desktop: Integration of proprietary data, (Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
data, and relational data), live access to IHS Energy's data hosting center
* Enerdeq Web Services: Integration of proprietary data into internal systems and 3rd party
applications
* Enerdeq ArcMap Extensions (i.e. extending data access to ESRI ArcMap® tools): live
access to most recent data, Integration (of data).
* Enerdeq Web Browser: Live access to most recent IHS Energy data
* More feature rich online capability than current product offering
Although it is not seen as a disruptive technology this is seen as a major transition which will
bring about discontinuity in performance for a period of time (see the S-Curve in Figure 2). This
disruption allows IHS Energy to better serve its mainstream and high end customers and gain greater
market penetration. Figure 4.1 represents this change showing the eventual expected jump in
Enerdeq performance, using a modification of Clayton Christenson's classic model taken from 'The
Innovator Dilemma' .
The Innovator's Dilemma:
"Sustaining" versus "Disruptive" technologies
Bringing Enerdeq to
the established market
U
A
C
Niche customer needs
...or low end disruption
Time
Clayton M. Christensen's "The Innovator's Dilemma"
Figure 4.1
The creation of the Enerdeq vision was strong. It was well understood among the middle
management of the company, but arguable not as well understood at the executive and CEO level. In
August 2006 the company began to put more strategic weight behind it, by naming Enerdeq the No. I1
strategic priority for 2007. However, the development and product integration efforts struggled in the
two to three years prior to the creation of this global vision. There is still a lot of integration work to
do to achieve this vision.
According to one senior member of management, the large number of adaptations required for the
integration can be broken down in terms of "people, process and technology". There were pretty big
changes on all three dimensions, but the people and cultural side of the integration was by far the
most difficult piece. All those interviewed agreed.
We will start by having a look at the adaptations required in technology and process areas.
It was a complete technology shift to move from where AccuMap had been, develop the next
generation of AccuMap and align it to the rest of organization. When work had started, prior to
Enerdeq, on the next generation of the AccuMap product, it began on a Java platform. Later as the
AccuMap team looked at where the market was heading and saw some of the technical limitations,
the decision was made to move away from Java and go to a .NET platform.
When the development teams from Denver joined in they basically joined part of that technology
platform spearheaded in Calgary. The development team in Calgary was focused on one aspect of
product, .NET development for the desktop applications and the Denver team was primarily focused
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on Java for some of the web based version. Merging from overall team perspective was less of an
issue, because the teams were structured in location where they were still using their processes and
their technologies.
One senior manager in Denver was tasked to take a look at what was needed in the form of core
architecture to bring all these pieces together. During the interviews he recalls "In doing that I found
extreme cultural differences between Canada, U.S. and the U.K. It was sort of astonishing. I didn't
think they'd be quite as big as they were. Another thing you find is a lot of pride in ownership. When
you've been successful with different product offerings you tend to gravitate towards those processes
and those technologies as being the best. You get a whole lot of discussion when you start going
across those (regional) alliances to which is the best way of approaching a particular challenge. We
had to learn a lot about each other over the course of three to four months to be able to get to the
point where we could form a consensus on what our strategy was going to be. When you've got three
different very distinctive cultures having that discussion we had some pretty lively debates."
In 2004 the technology decision related to the desktop was a relatively straight forward decision.
It had already been made by the AccuMap team, having looked at a couple of different options. In
that case everyone in the combined development team was okay with going down the Microsoft
.NET route. Initially the separate teams co-ordinated on different aspects of the same product but
they were primarily independent, with overlap taking place at the level of the architecture team.
Later integration between the teams increased, but full integration was never achieved.
One of the commonly understood goals with respect to technology development was the ability to
have developers move fluidly between products, new or old, where necessary by having common
platform and development tools and processes. This meant that functional teams (e.g. QA,
development, core architecture, interface design, product planning) were set up instead of product
teams. The goal was to spread the knowledge more effectively throughout the organization and help
ultimately bring consistency to the products from a user perspective. All products could integrate
with each other easier - like a product suite.
Today IHS is working to further reduce its infrastructure footprint by using common components
and following a service oriented architecture approach in order to realize significant cost saving. The
decision was made to take the next great step and standardize the technology across not only IHS
Energy but IHS Engineering also. The company has shifted the technology mix and IHS is moving
everything to a common windows technology stack.
There is a leap frog effect going on. Initially the Enerdeq group had decided to have a mix of
Windows on the desktop side and a JAVA oracle mix on the server side. Now two to three years on,
with the current version of Enerdeq the development group is trying to coalesce all of their
technology so that it is just .NET across the board. The group is dealing with some of those
technology and process merging issues still today and it hasn't been fully integrated yet. Long term
this common platform and common set of tools will be an acceleration point. As more content is
added the development team will be able to react more quickly and integrate the content into other
products much faster.
Most people agreed that the design of applications is considered a core competency within IHS
energy. Opinions differ on whether that application needs to be developed in-house or not. Some
executives believe that you need to understand what you are doing and be closely connected to your
customer in order to develop market leading software. Others believe that it doesn't matter if you are
developing an oil and gas application or some warehouse management package it can all be
outsourced. In the past year and a half in particular there is an increasing move towards an
outsourcing strategy and this evolution has resulted in the loss of a number of key people.
With regard to process adaptations AccuMap had a very well defined developed process, which
allowed a high number of incremental changes to be released with the latest data on monthly basis.
The integration was a massive development project on a much greater scale and totally different
processes were required to set that up. According to one senior developer leading the integration of
development groups means building "a deep understanding of processes and technologies used by
both development groups, with the goal of learning from each group". Merging of process or
technology should be considered, but alignment should only take place where it makes sense. "Try
not to merge or share just for the sake of it, it must benefit the customer in some way."
Given the strong process mindset sorting out the new processes apparently worked pretty well. A
strong team was pulled together although a number of those people have recently left the company.
The first two major releases are out and it's been done without really loosing any market share. Some
however, feel that the conflicts between local and global needs still exist and there has been no
leadership, (or processes) to help this resource shortage driven dilemma.
4.3 THE TRANSITION STRATEGY FROM OLD TO NEW
While some felt that the general development transition strategy, in terms of maintaining the old
and developing the new was achieved reasonably well, others felt that the investment in development
fell short of what was needed for the integration. According to one interviewee, "The danger or
challenge is if you don't pay attention to the old product, some competitor comes and kills you
before you get the new product out." This matter still requires attention today.
One manager believed that a major integration success was finding the right person to drive the
development of new integrated platform at the project management level. Bringing in an external
person was seen by some to relive a lot of the early team tension because there was less interest in
local politics.
Another perceived success was early customer engagement in a lot of the design work. When the
first release of product came out, it was not intended to replicate what AccuMap had, but it had
enough critical features for some clients to begin subscribing to it. The same is true of subsequent
releases. Despite these indications of early success, some believe that product performance fall far
short of expectations and this is exacerbated by instability problems and slow installs. Others feel
strongly that customers need to be engaged and consulted even more frequently that the current
development cycle allows for, which is approximately every couple of months.
During this time of transition, some managers were asked to step up to the plate and manage at
levels they hadn't managed at before. For most there was no initial mentoring or training or even
awareness of what was needed in this new context. Some managers felt completely out of their
depth, taking what they had learned along the way in a small organization and suddenly trying to
apply it in a larger group. Rewards and recognition primarily stayed the same, but the informal
recognition changed as people began to report to remote managers who had less interest in local
perspectives.
Success gave people an outward confidence. When they were placed in management or other new
roles for which they did not have the skills at the time, their confidence and strong relationships
helped them survive. Overtime the mismatch in expectations between them and their new bosses
created a strain. This strain meant that some groups were at times working in totally different
directions without anyone being held accountable for aligning their focus. With the benefit of
hindsight people saw that all people being promoted needed training and mentoring, regardless of
their previous success. These managers or key contributors could then be held accountable for their
progress. Despite these challenges or perhaps because of them the corporate group at IHS Inc. was
seen to do a good job of creating career paths for staff. They made an attempt to create an alignment
of cultures and some development goals were set.
A related challenge, according to some interviewees, was how to motivate the people maintaining
the legacy products, including AccuMap, ProbE, EGIS and PID-Plus so that they did not feel isolated
or like second class citizens as their resources dwindled. Managers feel they needed to be ready to
answer questions such as "What happens when the next generation comes? Do we all get fired?"
Addressing these questions and overcoming the lingering attitude of 'us versus them' continues to
require attention today. These issues are revisited again in Chapter 7.
4.4 THE CULTURAL ADAPTATION
According to one of the interviewees when it comes to integration there are three interconnected
factors to consider. "No.1 is leadership capability, effectiveness and styles. Change in leadership is
an extra element which comes into play in this case. No.2 is cultural differences, acknowledgement
and understanding of them and an effort to deal with them. No.3 is communication, which runs
through both of the previous pieces. Even with those two challenges, if you have good
communication you stand a better chance of fixing them. The communication isn't happening and
they are all intertwined that creates even more barriers. Leadership and culture are the big ones and
communication runs through them". In this person's view "these challenges weren't unexpected,
they just weren't addressed and they remain major issues today".
According to a second interviewee "Most of the barriers were the challenges of trying to weave a
reasonable political path through all the minefields" Management in the US office agree that the
Canadian group does a very good job of articulating values and establishing a culture and it had
turned into a very close knit organization. However, there was a general feeling of lack of
appreciation for the values and culture that exist within the other groups, particularly Denver.
Although they don't articulate their values or drive the culture openly, the managers believe that a
culture does exist in the kind of people hired and in how those people are treated. In contrast
Canada's culture is proudly displayed on the walls of the Calgary office for many years. It is well
specified and has been updated with enthusiasm over the years. One US manager believes that
specifying the values is something that needs to be done more in Denver.
One interviewee expressed concern that the values of dignity and respect, expressed within the
Canadian group, were not always extended to the people the group was working with outside
Canada. "That's where a lot of the clashes came from and a lot of bad feelings came out because of
that. There is a real danger of groups becoming too insular and not appreciating that although some
differences exist with other groups, that they are also effective." From the Denver perspective it also
had a very good team which was very close and tight in working together. "It really took bringing the
teams together and locking them away for a couple of weeks to solve problems together before the
barriers came down. Some people never got over it and they ended up being moved out of the
company. Some people don't like change. Some people just cannot ever deal with it."
The phrase 'command and control' was used repeatedly by almost everyone when referring to
Denver management and leadership style. One senior member of management responded "Denver is
all command and control and Cooper is command and control. When the merger took place I heard
this a hundred times. The truth is a long way from that. It's never been my style."
One tactical goal that was put in place but was very difficult for the global IT team to achieve was
to create and publish a common set of values. The goal was accomplished, but given the lack of
integration that still exists today these common values did not take hold. Everyone agrees teams went
into an 'us versus them' mode and there was lack of respect for the other teams. Denver was seen as
big bad corporate and Canada considered itself an island. Most people see that the cultural
differences are still there and still create tensions. Some see the differences in terms of life style
choices, where people in the U.S. and U.K. offices are expected to consistently work 60-70 hours a
week, whereas they are not prepared to set those expectations in Canada. Although managers accept
that people burn-out and the attrition rate goes up even more with that expectation; it is seen as the
preferred working model.
The cultures were also different in terms of incentives. In Denver profit sharing was not an
established practice for everyone as it had been in Canada. In Denver people were motivated by
personal career opportunities and the chance to learn new skills or processes. The development
groups formed to take the product to the next level were motivated in those terms, rather than by
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company profit sharing. According to one interviewee "When people got to chart a path and had a
stake in which way we were going to go, rather than being thrown a set of spec and say here develop
this, they were motivated. When the groups began to integrate some developers still wanted to be
associated with a particular product and not just an organization. Some lost interest when assigned to
a functional group or when multitasking on different products and projects. If it didn't fit with their
career objective they would just move on".
Some still see that the command and control approach may be the only way forward and believe
that the current phase is more of a benevolent dictator phase. "As the company is going to
standardize onto one platform therefore there is less room for discussion. There are so many more
objectives to move onto a standard set of technology and core architecture that probably the only
way it's going to happen, is to force it."
Side by side with this you had a Canadian company that's been a market leader for over a decade
where profit sharing was a powerful motivator and an established profit mechanism for everyone.
The developers operated very well on their own, closely interfacing with their local customers. Now
they are told to be a global company and respond to the directions from a remote functional group,
and have no customer interaction. The company has lost quite a few key players because they could
not embrace this change.
4.5 WHAT WOULD PEOPLE DO DIFFERENTLY WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT?
All people agreed that they would spend a lot more time on the team work aspects of integration and
not just assume that it was going to happen. The regional barriers remained in place a lot longer than
expected. Many believe that the remaining cultural issues still need to be acknowledged and
reconciled before integration can be fully achieved. Most believed that understanding and
anticipating what losses might take place in each group would have helped.
One interviewee expressed the strongly held belief that "It comes down to leadership,
understanding how to integrate the different teams and cultures, creating the vision to follow and
then getting the people to follow." Most agree that it helps to explicitly state the values and work
towards more open communication.
Engaging all of the stakeholders sooner, including sales and marketing, the content group,
product managers and project managers, would have reduced some of the barriers and accelerated
progress even if it dragged out the initial discussions.
While there were different views as to the importance of reward structures, such as profit sharing,
most agreed that incentives needed to be aligned if the company was to shift towards a more global
focus rather than a local or regional focus. Others felt that turnover was inevitable and mitigation
plans were put in place, but they were not proactive enough to cover the loss of critical people, for
example those with domain knowledge expertise who took a long time to replace.
Different elements of the former cultures are still floating around. Most people struggle to define
what today's integrated culture is. All opinions differ. Some see broken remnants of an old culture,
others see a blended but undefined new culture where people work better together. Some appear
confused, and others feel less empowered to influence. There is yet another new leader in Mike Neal
with very direct style for the global IT services and systems team. People are adjusting once again.
This is a perfect opportunity to give some attention to defining the culture. This matter is discussed
again in Chapter 7.
4.6 SUMMARY
Below is a list of topics which interviewees believe still need to be addressed following the
integration of product development resources into the global IT services and systems group. Many of
these topics are further addressed in Chapter 7.
* Set unified direction for team by clearly defining goals and priorities.
* Address critical resource allocation problems
* Continue to engage customer closely (to identify value capture opportunities)
* Agree core competencies, (e.g. with respect to outsourcing strategy) so that career paths can
be established and unnecessary staff turn-over avoided
* Ensure respect for each group culture, traditions and their espoused values by continually
acknowledging what changes people are being asked to make, through clear and frequent
communication.
* Keep what is best about old processes, recognizing the opportunities to enhance or discard
them.
CHAPTER 5 - TRANSITION TO GLOBAL MATRIXED ORGANISATION
Here we examine the collective responses to research question No..5 which asks "What lessons has
IHS Energy learned in moving from a regional business unit (BU) controlled software development
function, to a global function controlled within a global matrix organization?"
In 2003 IHS Energy began restructuring into a matrixed organization with functionally control
groups replacing the regional business units. HR and finance groups were among those that quickly
became part of the respective global centralized functions. All software development functions and
Information Services groups became part of the global information technology (IT) group. While
many feel that this has allowed groups to learn from each other and create greater common goals or
visions than could be created by one group, all those interviewed agree that it has not been a smooth
transition. Many lessons have to be learned or re-learned as management at all levels continues to
change.
The outline structure, described below, relates to a discussion on 'Building Successful
Organizations', which was taken from a lecture on 'Managing through Discontinuities', April 10,
2007. This lecture was part of the MIT Sloan 'Technology Strategy' course (Course No. 15.912)
taught by Professor Rebecca Henderson.
* Lead: Creating and communication a greater shared vision
Build a senior team, communicate the strategy and allocate resources
* Structure: The effects of the matrixed organization on the innovation cycle
Explore transitional and intermediate forms
Getting Worse Before Better (WBB)
* Incent: Align regional incentives with global strategies
Explain "Just what's in this for me?"
* Build: Customer inputs to the innovation cycle
Lay the foundations for a new culture, new expectations
5.1 LEAD - CREATE AND COMMUNICATE A GREATER SHARED VISION
In the global IT development organization the management structure was aligned to help create a
shared vision of a consolidated global product portfolio. According to a former AccuMap developer
"The shared goal has expanded since 2003. There is even more consolidation than originally
envisioned". When the developers began to see the overlap, they realized how much of a difference
they really could make if they shared product architecture. Certain architectural designs are now
being adopted to allow products to be shared more easily.
People interviewed accepted that initially some regional groups had been a bit small minded and
tended to look only at the regional market needs, where all their revenue and expertise lay. For
example in Calgary the early vision for replacing AccuMap did not include a browser interface or
on-line data access. Consolidating products was a long term goal, but not a priority given limited
resources. The feedback back and forth helped to create a greater vision of replacing as many
products as possible and eventually supporting a smaller technology footprint.
Developers got the go ahead to start working on the project without the full plans. Neither the
leadership nor the infrastructure was seen as strong. People felt that the leadership was initially
paying lip service, by asking managers to do things for which they did not have resources. As this
great vision has evolved, people feel it has not been well communicated to the rank and file members
of the global IT organization. Without proper communication the de-facto strategy, as discussed in
chapter one and the use of resources cannot be fully aligned with this vision. Some infrastructure
alignment has occurred and there is increasing focus on this area. The Enerdeq desktop and browser
share the same UI designs and the goal of sharing the same core architecture was initiated in late '06.
Some people expressed concern about the effect this will have on the remaining entrepreneurial
energy in the company and this issue is examined next in looking at the company's innovation cycle.
5.2 STRUCTURE - THE EFFECTS OF A MATRIXED ORGANIZATION ON THE
INNOVATION CYCLE
Mike Neal, the new global IT group leader, is seen as very visionary and he shares the earlier
vision of innovative product consolidation, code sharing architecture and common tools across all of
IHS. There "is ome flexibility and some recognition of historic cultures in that groups don't have to
change tools today. The perceived leadership style of "command and control" still dominates within
the global IT management level according to those interviewed. Most agreed that dealing with
demands of being micro-managed or controlled took from the time they have to guide and explain
things to developers. This loss of momentum impacted innovation work and only served to
underscore any cultural differences which still existed. This is a classic example of the tension that
exists between innovation and operational groups. Figure 5.1 shows the complimentary strengths of
both groups and highlights the need for consciously accepting that tension in order to create a
successful merged organization. Successful global organizations require leaders who will openly and
continually address this tension in order to meet the needs of both groups.
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With the changes in leadership in IHS Energy many feel that the lessons learned in moving to the
global matrixed organization are being re-learned again. The main lesson is that constant budgetary
w ........... .
constraints and meeting demanding management requests, continues to exacerbate the problems of
lack of resources. This continuing cycle is eroding the company's ability to innovate which in turn
impacts revenues. In system dynamic terms such a cycle is known as a negative reinforcing loop.
This innovation cycle is shown in the 'system dynamics' diagram below using feedback processes to
represent the dynamic nature of the cycle. Systems dynamics is field of study which allows complex
and dynamic organizations or systems, to be described in terms of feedback processes and other
structures which are then modeled using computer simulators. See Figure 5.2. The company's
'Innovation Erosion' loop is shown as a self reinforcing loop (R) which means the prevailing
situation (whether good or bad) is strengthened.
Shortened
Market Share Development Lifecycle
Customer Delight (Low)
: Reinforcing Loop:
A self-reinforcing
process or positive
fecdback loop.
=- Balancing
A self-corrc
process or nc
feedback k
Ac
Drive (Low)
Product
RD Innovation Erosion Panic (High)
Solutions Budget Contraints
Strategy (Poor
Employee or none)
In (igh)
Resource Allocation
. . - (Lowered)
roduct
Lifecycle
on
R&D Decision Capacity from ngic Pr(
Investment \ Managei
Customer Needs met /
with Current Product + Project Management
Core Architecture Planning
Knowledge 
-
Executive
Responsiveness
oduct
ment Input
New Tech &
Competitor
Monitoring
Figure 5.2
There are a number of ways to balance this negative loop, the main one being to apply more
resources either internally in the development group, or external to the group or both. According to
those interviewed to successfully launch the Enerdeq products resources are needed in three areas,
core architecture knowledge, product management and sales, the latter two requiring more focus on
new products. When looking at Figure 5.2 we see that these resources affect three major feedback
loops, namely the 'Profit Engine', 'Innovation Engine', and 'Innovation Erosion' loops. Loss of
W
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developers with core architecture knowledge for existing products is still a critical issue as it places
additional pressure to retain market share by releasing new products early with quick fixes which
must be addressed later. This further slows down the overall product replacement schedule. This
forces people into the 'Panic Loop' as represented in Figure 5.2. In summary the lack of resources in
any one of these critical areas means the innovation cycle is not balanced and cannot achieve its
revenue targets.
When development resources are constantly constrained there is no time for skunk-works
projects, creativity or playing with technology. The innovation cycle is totally reliant on external
inputs for new ideas as the internal resources have no time to explore creative ideas. Even if the
organization chooses to go to an outsourcing model for software development and data accumulation
it needs a process to generate innovative ideas and manage the subsequent development: Most of the
core interviewees agreed that the global organization needs to be more tightly integrated internally,
regardless of the future innovation strategy.
5.3 GETTING WORSE BEFORE BETTER
One of the challenges in managing the trade-offs between short term profit and long term goals is
the up front investment of time and resources required to achieve the long term goals. It is very
difficult to accurately determine how long the effort will take and how large the investment will be.
When moving to a global organization, the same up front investment is needed to reassess goals and
reprioritize projects on a case by case basis. Regardless of the structure used the company will be in
overload and the reality is that things will get worse before they get better. This phenomenon is know
as 'Worse Before Better' (WBB) and is often overlooked or its effects underestimated when
changing the structure of the organization.
In moving to a global matrix organization in IHS Energy things got 'Worse Before Better' and
many groups in the company went into firefighting mode. Some groups such as HR and Finance
went through the WBB phase more quickly than others, centralizing and standardizing tools and
practices relatively quickly. The IT group, because of its less structured and innovative nature, was
going to take longer. People disagreed as to which part of the innovation cycle needed attention.
Some felt there was an overemphasis on achieving the schedule which leads to a tendency to "fix the
problem in the next release". Others felt that there was no time for elegant discussions about how to
get there as meeting the release schedule was the number one priority. Tension resulted and groups
went into firefighting mode in order to meet release dates. Despite new resources the company was
struggling to gear up for growth as this industry had been in a contracting cycle for over a decade.
Decision making during this time was slow and inadequate according to those core interviewees. It
was felt that even bad decisions were better than no decisions because they could make mistakes and
recover, which actually aided the WBB process.
One of the biggest challenges in addressing WBB is deciding where to start fixing the problem. In
order to get the innovation cycle running effectively, you have to address the whole dynamic system
at once. In the case of the Global IT group this means addressing the company resource issues. The
risk of not addressing this innovation or product development cycle is that they system could
eventually tip into constant firefighting mode, which would permanently erode the innovation
capability. Tipping point can be thought of as the productivity level above which the system becomes
unstable, where the addition of any new development project or the further loss of resources would
result in the company spiraling into reaction mode. Clearly it is a lot more expensive and more
difficult for a development group to recover from such a position.
Given the excessive focus on bottom line growth in IHS Energy and the prolonged WBB situation
that exists in the Global IT group due to lack of resources, there is still a risk that the organization
could cross over the tipping point into continual firefighting mode. The use of project management
for multi-site collaboration projects mitigates this risk as does articulating a clear strategy and
aligning incentives with global goals.
5.4 INCENT: ALIGN REGIONAL INCENTIVES WITH GLOBAL STRATEGIES
In 2003 when developers within a region were carved up into global sub-teams they reported to
managers outside their regional office. This was a new concept to most of them and many felt
confused and isolated. The local management team was suddenly disconnected from the resources it
had previously directed and supported in a very hands-on way. Some managers felt frustrated and
disempowered as they were no longer able to influence the product development or the assignments
of the developers. No-one wanted to own the regional development project as many people felt that it
was being driven by the global group and not by the BU as it raised the question "Just what's in this
for me?"
Some managers felt their role was reduced to sitting on the sidelines giving verbal but no
actionable support. To some others it appeared as though local managers were much more actively
engaged than they were. During these interviews it became apparent that sometimes senior members
of management believed someone else was looking after a critical activity when in effect no one was
paying attention to it for months at a time One example of this occurred during 2005 when there was
no product management in Calgary for almost four months and no member of senior management
pushing for an urgent resolution. This meant there was no customer input and minimal innovation
during that time. Today, managers and developers have come to accept that the development
resources are globally owned and there is wide appreciation of the need for project managers' skills
and product management empowerment to effectively handle multi-site collaborative development
projects.
Today however, management teams are still incentivized based on local revenue and margin
growth. This makes it still very difficult for the global functionally driven groups to roll out a global
strategy or achieve long term goals as regional managers have their incentives aligned with the short
term goals of the company. Developers could be assigned to working on joint development for
building the overall architecture, which meant that they were not working on product for their local
business unit and not impacting the bottom-line. This created a sense of conflict, in the Canadian
office, for example where developers were being asked to work on tasks for the benefit of whole
company, but these tasks would not impact Calgary profit share or their own salary. In such cases the
line of sight to the overall corporate objectives is effectively lost and people don't understand "Just
what's in this for me? All of the core interviewees agreed that incentives need to be better aligned
with global strategies, if the model of having global functional matrixed units is to work properly.
5.5 BUILD: CUSTOMER INPUT TO THE INNOVATION CYCLE
When Jerre Stead took over as CEO in November 2006, he set about laying a foundation for a
stronger company culture based on the fundamental principle which he has been articulating since
day one. Stead laid out four primary objectives which are;
1. Customer delight
2. Colleague success
3. Profitable top and bottom line growth
4. Share-owner success
Since day one, his focus has set about creating a clear line of sight for everyone in the
organization. All agree that this increased attention to the customer is welcome. However, it still has
to be balanced with improving the bottom line growth. Regardless of concerns about how this will be
done, Stead has managed to set new expectation for employees, customers and shareholders alike.
Most people agreed that there is not enough customer input into the innovation cycle, whether it
is to product managers or to software development leaders involved in functional design. All agree
that the matrix organization has greatly increased the complexity and challenge of understanding
customer needs. The corporate directive of centralizing, globalization, standardization, and reducing
cost to improve bottom line appears to be at constant odds with the need to look at and understand
customer needs and respond in a highly innovative way. Developers are further from the customer in
a functional global matrixed organization but arguably that is okay if they are closely linked to
product managers. The structure of the matrixed organization itself, with regional or remote
management, is not seen as an issue once people have easy daily access to the groups or individuals
they need to talk to. For many Enerdeq developers, they are satisfied when they have access to
product managers with good understanding of the customers' future needs or to development
managers who can help them understand the big picture of the innovative environment.
According to core interviewees, capturing customer needs would not necessarily be more
effective if left to the regional business units because of the regional tendency to focus on current
product replacement. On the other hand some argued that the company is too focused on global
needs over local strategy and the lack of resources there puts current revenue at risk. All people
agree that momentum is still being lost as managers struggle to figure out the balance between local
and global needs and the resource needs for old versus new products. The benefit of the matrixed
organization under strong leadership is the ability to share knowledge and achieve greater integration
and consolidation than could possibly be achieved in isolation. Strong and clear direction from
global IT leadership is needed to remove the obstacles to capturing both the local and global
customer needs.
5.6 LESSONS FROM LITERATURE
The main observations from the responses given to research question No.5 are summarized
below.
* Moving to a global matrixed organization has helped to improve product consolidation and
grow a larger vision for future product innovation according to some interviewees. Not
everyone is yet convinced and they need to be, so they can buy-into and act on that vision.
* Excessive focus on bottom line growth makes it more difficult to move out of 'WBB'
situation.
* Resource shortage is the single biggest contributing factor to 'Innovation Erosion' as
described in system dynamic diagram 6.1
* Regional incentives need to be aligned with global strategies for managers and developers.
* The voice of the customer is being lost in this matrixed organization.
The observation that is most complex to deal with is the issue of moving through the period of
'Worse Before Better' which is prolonged by the excessive focus at IHS Inc. on bottom line growth.
Some brief highlights from a pertinent HBS case study entitled 'Improving the Product Development
Process at Kirkham Instruments Corporation' are included below. The case study raises challenging
questions on the combination of leadership, measurement and process in a way that is highly relevant
to the innovation challenges at IHS Inc. It also provides some insight into why companies remain in
a 'Worse Before Better' situation for much longer than expected.
In the early 1990s the company, identified as Kirkham Instruments, decided to centralize new
product development decisions because customers wanted to link products into integrated systems.
This meant that the next generation products would require a lot of coordinated design and
development. The company faced a number of challenges. Firstly, the number of products being
developed needed to be cut as the company did not have the innovation capability to meet its current
projects commitments. Secondly, the company needed to distinguish between major breakthrough
development projects and incremental development work. Thirdly, the company had to come up with
an effective way of killing projects which did not fit its strategy.
The CEO was clearly committed to and passionate about making the necessary changes.
Independent experts were brought in. A comprehensive change strategy was created. New employee
training and project monitoring was put in place. All aspects of the changes were considered.
Despite the investment and commitment, the outcome showed little effective change. The number of
projects remained about the same and bureaucracy of getting projects through had increased rather
than decreased.
The company was not prepared for a prolongued situation where things would need to get 'Worse
Before Better.' If the company was actually going to cut projects there would be an initial impact on
the company revenues. So the revenue growth problem it was seeking to address in making these
changes would get worse before it got better. If the company wanted to embrace the challenge of
creating products which are linked via integrated systems, then significant new platform
development was needed. Building the organizational structures and skills required to accommodate
all the necessary cross-functional activities would be a costly and time consuming undertaking which
would further impact revenues. The company would have to allow profitability to take a hit in the
short term and it was not clear that the company had enough data to understand the implications of
making a real commitment to improving its innovative capability.
Kirkham Instruments is representative of many companies who find themselves in this situation.
It is worth highlighting that all observations made above contribute in some way to prolonging the
WBB situation. In the global matrixed organization it is important to consider addressing all these
issues at the same time in as far as is possible.
CHAPTER 6 - WHAT ARE THE CURRENT BARRIERS TO INNOVATION?
Here we consider the organization structure and use the Organizational Congruence Model when
reviewing responses to research question No.6 "What are the current barriers to innovation?"
In previous chapters we have discussed many of the challenges that IHS Energy and the former
AccuMap Company have overcome with regard to innovation and we acknowledge that many
challenges still exist today. Now we look at how the factors combine to create a set of barriers to
innovation within today's matrixed global IT organization. We use a modified version of the
Organizational Congruence model, shown in Figure 6.1. This version of the model formed part of
class discussions during the MIT Sloan course, No. 15.388 'Designing and Leading the Innovative
Organization' Spring 2007, with Professor Diane Burton.
We divided the organizational structure into four building blocks listed below. We examine how
well these elements are aligned to each other, and in particular, how well they support achieving the
critical tasks.
1. Key Success Factors or Critical Tasks
2. Culture or Informal Organization
3. Formal Organization
4. Human Resources or People
Two factors which exert considerable influence over the organizational structure are the executive
leadership and the company strategy and these are also considered. The critical tasks are aligned to
the de-facto company strategy, the strategy which the company is striving to implement day to day
(see Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1).
By grouping the issues raised in previous chapters into the four component building blocks and
tying them into the company's strategy and leadership approach we gain additional insight into what
challenges exist from an organizational perspective.
Organizational Alignment - The Congruence Model
Strateqy/Vision Executive Leadership
" What business are we in?k I - Model
* How will we compete? - Behavior
" What's our vision ? . Symbolic action
Key Success Factors
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* Structure? Controls?
* Rewards? Careers?
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6.1 CRITICAL TASKS OR KEY SUCCESS FACTORS
We start by looking at the critical task, for IHS Energy and the Global IT services and systems
group, with regard to development of new products. We see how well the rest of the organization is
aligned to successfully achieve these tasks and how integrated and aligned these tasks are with the
overriding company strategy. From the interviews it appears that the commonly understood goal of
the global IT group was to protect and grow the existing product revenue stream. Given this goal and
the challenges identified by the interviewees the critical task, listed below, were derived.
1. Maintain efficient and cost effective product development process
2. Increase Value Capture (of the customers business)
3. Communicate big picture goals to all stakeholders
These tasks are essential for IHS Energy to succeed in achieving its strategic goal of creating a
unified energy product platform, Enerdeq, as the global replacement for the existing product suite.
From the interviews it was clear that people would prioritize these tasks differently and some would
focus on only one of these tasks, namely to maintain a cost effective product development process.
The problem with the singular focus on this task is that it assumes that IHS Energy's historical
collection of production data (or content) will continue to ensure its market leadership going forward.
Today competitors cannot buy this data from any single source and pre-1970 data is very expensive.
However, if the customer decided that it didn't need pre-1970 data the barrier to entry for competitors
would immediately drop.
Some also point to the fact that IHS Energy has promised customers replacement products since
2003 and the company is loosing credibility by not delivering on this promise. Given the subscription
based selling, it is not immediately obvious what impact these delays are having on the customer's
buying patterns as they do not emerge for a few years. Most of core group of interviewees, as
identified in Chapter 1, agreed that IHS Energy has to increase its value capture, and get deeper into
the customer base in selected segments. However, there was little consensus on how this should be
done, how it could be funded and whose role it should be.
From this analysis it is clear that communicating the big picture becomes increasingly important
so that everyone is moving in the same direction with the same top priorities. Figure 6.2 below shows
a summary of the organizational alignment for IHS Energy as interpreted from the research
interviews conducted for this thesis.
6.2 CULTURE OR INFORMAL ORGANIZATION
MIT Sloan Professor, Edgar Schein, is a recognized leading authority on organizational
psychology. In his writings on 'The Role of the Founder in Creating Organizational Culture' he
states that "Organizational culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented,
discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration."
Thus the culture of the organization emerges as the people within the group learn to solve
problems together. Given that the IHS Energy Global IT group was integrated in 2003 to address
some common IT goals we look at what culture prevails or has evolved in terms of norms, values,
attitudes, and behaviors and whether these help the company achieve its critical tasks.
The management style norms, as expressed in the interviews, were of command and control, and
micromanaging in order to achieve cost cutting targets. Given that the oil and gas industry was in a
contracting mode for over a decade, developers in the U.S. and U.K. offices were used to operating in
an environment of cost cuts and constant understaffing. Any decisions made were final. In contrast
the management style norms in Canada were of open transparent communication and accessibility.
The developers in the Canadian office were used to being part of a small growing successful
organization enjoying the benefits of profit sharing. Any decisions made were open to debate and
challenge, particularly when it came to technology decisions which, according to one interviewee,
were usually best kept out of the hands of managers.
Today, when it comes to maintain an efficient and cost effective product development process,
the established group norms for dealing with problems are very different. Developers coming from a
contracting business environment will seek to cut cost rather than invest in creating higher value.
Developers who come from an expanding business environment will want to look for solutions by
dabbling in skunk-works and playing with new leading technologies.
In order to reconcile these differences, developers in the new global IT organization and other
key stakeholders such as product managers and project managers need to be empowered to make
decisions, so that all those involved across the entire product development lifecycle can learn from
solving problems together, instead of waiting for someone to decree the solution. A global matrixed
organization is strengthened when those with responsibility are also given the authority or
empowerment to make decisions.
The values embraced by IHS Energy in Canada were established many years ago and these were
modified in recent years by a cross functional group of employees. They are proudly displayed on
large wall posters throughout the company. These six values are Integrity, Excellence, Teamwork,
Fun, Customers and Communication. These values encourage risk taking and exploring and generate
excitement within the development community by maintaining focus on the longer term goals of the
organization. The values of IHS Inc. are captured in the four primary objectives stated by Stead, the
new CEO. These are - Customer Delight, Colleague Success, Profitable Top and Bottom Line Growth
and Share-owner Success. The values focus more on short term needs of a public company, while
expanding this focus to include longer term customer delight. This reflects the mix of the two cultures
which are now integrated in the global IT group.
When it comes to achieving the critical product development tasks this tension between the short
term and long term goals translates into tension between immediate low cost solutions and long term
cost effective solutions. This relates back to the innovation erosion loop within the product
development cycle (see Chapter 5, Figure 5.2) where resource shortage is the critical issue arising
from excessive focus on cost cutting or bottom line growth.
The critical task of increasing value capture by analyzing customer data is needed to grow the top
line. However, this cannot be achieved without realigning resource and tightly integrating all the
stakeholders who link the customers to the developers.
Based on the interviews conducted it is felt that the attitude of 'us versus them' still prevails
today, though to a lesser extent than in 2003. There is still a sense of 'uniting against the enemy'
when it comes to perceptions of micromanaging and increasing bureaucratic demands. This begs the
question 'Who benefits from making the other side the enemy?' In a way the beneficiary is the
strengthening of the local culture in Canada which has had both a positive and negative effect. The
other attitude that prevails is that 'The tail can't wag the dog.' This sums up why it is difficult for the
large acquiring company to embrace and learn from the successes of the acquired company, for
example leveraging some of the Canadian knowledge on how to assimilate acquisitions. Another
very strongly held view is that 'content is king - so the competition can't catch us'. Given these three
fairly strongly held attitudes it makes the final critical task even more important. Clearly
communicating the big picture goals to all stakeholders is essential to break through isolating
attitudes and have everyone moving in the same direction
One behavioral norm discussed repeatedly during the interviews was the willingness to challenge
the status quo. This is considered, by some, as an important behavioral norm which stimulates
innovation through constantly testing ideas. Others consider this a luxury, which has no place in
development projects. As one interviewee put it "With command and control, you don't have time for
elegant discussions on how we are going to get there - schedule is priority"
If this behavior of challenging the status quo is not accompanied by respect for the company and
all its employees, or if it is allowed to go unchecked, it can lead to strong resistance to change and
ultimately conflict. While lack of respect is an issue, conflict in itself is not a problem. Conflict is a
clear indicator that there are strongly held opposing views which need to be reconciled in terms of the
work that the group or individual is doing. According to the core interviewees, there is no agreed
method for dealing with conflict within IHS Energy and there was a sense that it was not necessary.
However, if an underlying conflict goes unaddressed it creates a definite barrier to innovation. In
chapter 7 we discuss in more detail how a culture of high conflict and high respect can actually
benefit the innovative organization.
Organizational Alignment
IHS Energy & The Global IT Group
Ref "Winning through Innovation" M. Tushman & C. O'Reilly III,
Figure 6.2
6.3 FORMAL ORGANIZATION
The global IT group is continually challenged to find shared solutions to reducing the product
development lifecycle and release new products more and more quickly. Formal project management
practices are then set up to achieve this. The risks associated with this excessive focusing on schedule
is that early stage development work gets squeezed out and late stage firefighting becomes more
common in order to meet approaching deadlines. When this is practiced over time a firefighting
culture develops, where quick fix solutions become acceptable with the intention of addressing the
problem in later releases. People start to take this approach for granted as firefighting heroes are
rewarded and early stage work becomes less and less valued. According to Schein "The model of
organizational culture that then emerges is one of shared solutions to problems which work well
enough to begin to be taken for granted - to the point where they drop out of awareness, become
unconscious assumptions, and are taught to new members as a reality and as the correct way to view
things."
A number of the interviewees acknowledged that firefighting and finding quick fix was becoming
increasingly common and new hires are getting used to this as the norm. This could be partly
addressed in the hiring process, by hiring experienced developers, for example with high domain
expertise. Management is apparently attempting to fix the firefighting approach by putting more
formal processes in place. This increase in monitoring can contribute to the 'panic loop' in the
innovation erosion cycle which was described initially in chapter 5. See Figure 6.3. From an
organizational congruency perspective setting up the formal processes with schedule as the top
priority can erode the company's ability to achieve its main critical task of maintaining efficient and
cost effective product development processes. One way to address this is to significantly cut the
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number of projects in the loop and the other way is to add resources. Regardless of which solution is
chosen, applying any change to the system will result in a 'Worse Before Better' period as described
in Chapter 5.
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All core interviewees referred to the organizational changes in the global IT group which have
taken place in the last six months under the new leadership of Mike Neal. While many see his
leadership as visionary, as discussed in previous chapters, many people expressed concern that "the
dialog between product managers, developers and customers is de-emphasized" with the new
structure. This concern was expressed in a number of different ways. "The new philosophy is that
product managers just tell developers what they want and developers go away and build it". Another
interviewee expressed concern that the gap between the business development or product
management role and software development role was widening. "The innovation factor comes from
both customer desires in response to market situations and our own smart people coming up with
ideas. We need to get internal connectivity more tightly integrated". This is seen as essential in order
to implement key customer requirements and deliver according to promises made to customers.
Interviewees also expressed concern that the formal structure does not link development to the sales
and marketing teams to help them understand the new products so they will begin aggressively
promoting and selling them.
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Within the new structure product managers are now focused on one or two products in all regions
rather than eight to ten products. This change in formal approach to product management was
welcomed by those interviewed. Some of the core interviewees believe that this product
management needs more skills in managing new products as distinct from well established products
and that this needs to be connected to the hiring processes.
Another concern related to the formal organization was the absence of a knowledge capture
process. This is important not just within the global IT group with loss of domain expertise, but in
this oil and gas service industry in general, where data collection and capture processes are done by
individuals scattered across the organization without any defined processes. Having formal
knowledge capture processes would minimize the risk of loosing key stakeholders in the
development lifecycle. It would-also help to capture lessons learned from the transition to the global
matrixed organization, so people don't perceive that the same lessons are being relearned under
successive management.
6.4 HUMAN RESOURCES OR PEOPLE
Despite the strong values based management style of IHS Energy Canada and the well
acknowledged and well established culture which employees enjoy many of the former AccuMap
and QC Data employees have left the company in recent years, particularly from the development
group. The emphasis on cost cutting has made it increasingly difficult to retain the top people. The
senior developers who recently left IHS Energy Canada did not wish to become 'code monkeys'
where the excessive focus on the product development schedule meant there was no time for
exploring or creativity. This same emphasis on cost cutting means that replacements hires cost less
and are more junior. While people hired in both US and in Canada have the necessary competencies,
they lack the many benefits that come with years of experience.
There are real differences between what is seen as motivation, within the U.S. or U.K.
development teams and the Canadian team. According to core interviewees developers in the U.S.
and U.K. are primarily motivated by the prospect of their product being deployed worldwide across a
wide customer base. They are also motivated on more short term basis by the opportunity to work on
new projects or with new technologies. They believe that cost cutting keeps them in business so they
are motivated to cut costs with a view to having further projects to work on in the future.
Profit sharing exists in IHS Energy Canada, as a continuing part of company practice. The
Canadian employees interviewed referred to the profit sharing as an ongoing motivator, but it is
closely connected with a desire to understand and satisfy customers because increase in customer
sales means higher profit sharing. In sharp contract developers in IHS Energy are motivated by cost
efficiency and not by cost cutting. They see the latter as eroding their ability to explore new options
and take risks so that they can create more highly innovative leading products. Profit sharing
promotes more long term company loyalty, but according to core interviewees, the attractiveness of
profit share has been offset by the continued restrictions on way they work and the lack of
understanding of the big picture goals with respect to product development.
Given that the right skills exist but are constantly being eroded, communicating the big picture
goals and establishing incentives which are aligned to the global goals or long term strategies, would
help align this piece of the organizational model.
6.5 STRATEGY
Throughout the interviews people repeatedly expressed a desire to understand the big picture
goals more clearly. Many sought to understand how their work fitted in with the company strategy
and future direction. In Chapter 1, Figure 3 we showed Christensen's approach to managing the
strategy development process taken from The Innovator's Solution' . Here we use that same model to
represent IHS Energy's strategy today. See Figure 6.4.
This summary of the company strategy was derived solely from responses to the interview questions.
It shows the company's actual strategy, which is made up of what the company intended to do, its
'deliberate strategy', as well as what just happened which is the unintended or 'emergent strategy'.
According to one interviewee, "IHS isn't a great funder of R&D. I don't ever expect it to be. But
certainly we will get companies that have innovation that fit in our industry that may be very
complimentary to the organization and grow a lot faster." Another interviewee stated "I don't think
Enerdeq is innovative. We never really intended it." A third interviewee expressed concern that "we
have adapted the strategy in terms of Enerdeq goals, the issue is that we have not consistently
executed on it. We were looking at how customers wanted to integrate different deployment types in
all the regions." The concern is that as a result of focusing only on replacement certain deployments
have been pigeon-holed in certain regions and other opportunities are being missed.
When it came to a question of whether Enerdeq was an innovative product or simply a
replacement product platform one interviewee responded, "We will supply enough functionality to
where we don't loose our customers. We are the market leader and we don't want to give customers
up to the competition. There are certain expectations. (We will) offer a product that improves work
flow and offers key functionality that (previous products) did have. You don't have to replace
everything." Since this is considered a replacement product many believe that the company is left
vulnerable while customers are changing from legacy products to the new product platform.
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An overview of the above strategy was discussed with Clayton Christensen during the course of
this research. He considered the situation of a company having a deliberate strategy to focus on
acquisitions to maintain high profit margins, rather than to increase innovation. Christensen
responded "Generally in a situation like that, the actually strategy comes in right to left, (referring to
Figure 6.4). People get ideas for projects and those ideas then populate the matrix and you try to
develop the capacity to do it and that then defines what the strategy actually is. The management
thinks they are in charge but they really are not. You can kind of impute when you see what comes
out, what the resource allocation process is, what can get through the gate and what can't get through
the gate" He further quoted Andy Grove as he does in The Innovator's Solution. "To understand
companies' actual strategies, pay attention to what they do, rather than what they say."
In his HBS case study entitled 'Using Aggregate Project Planning to Link Strategy, Innovation,
and the Resource Allocation Process' , Christensen describes this process in greater detail. The
strategy making process generally flows from right to left when a market is emerging or undergoing
radical change. According to the case study "when the deliberate strategy processes need to
predominate, however, the strategy-making process needs to begin to flow from left to right. It must
begin with a clearly articulated, broadly understood strategy."
In the past six months it appears that a more deliberate strategy processes has been established
within the global IT group. Yet almost all interviewees expressed a strong desire to have more clarity
regarding the strategy and related big picture goals. In my view, articulating and communicating the
strategy cannot be overemphasized at this time.
6.6 EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP STYLE
Chapter 3 we discussed in great detail responses to the research question "How do leadership
styles and values impact a company's ability to create radically innovative products?" This question
ties in well with the question to be asked using the organizational congruence model, "How well
does the executive leadership style support achieving the critical tasks?" The following list
summarizes, in no particular order, what interviewees considered to be the most important leadership
styles and values, which impact a company's ability to create radically innovative products. This
relates closely to the critical task of maintain an efficient and cost effective product development
process.
* Set and articulate a clear vision
* Align incentives to top objectives
* Guide functional management in aligning short term cost controls and long term strategy
* Set up monitoring with flexibility
* Communicate frequently and openly
* Empower employees
* Ensure high level of responsiveness to customer and competition
The critical task of increasing value capture would be supported by the desired leadership style of
guiding functional management in aligning short term cost controls and long term strategy.
According to one interviewee "Stead is making sure everyone understands the vision and goals of
the company so that there isn't separation and it flows all the way down. He is trying to embed
practices and put measurement systems in place to support this." This style is strongly supportive of
achieving the third critical task of communicating the big picture goals to all stakeholder and most
believe that his style will gradually influence all management levels as early signs suggest.
6.7 SUMMARY
Barriers to innovation can be addressed by aligning the organizational structure to ensure critical tasks
can be achieved. The issues that need to be addressed are listed below the related critical tasks which
were derived as part of this research.
Maintain an efficient and cost effective product development process
* Reduce product development lifecycle
* Implement key customer requirements and deliver per promise to customer
* Ramp up critical hiring and replacement
* Engage sales and marketing in selling the new product
* Reduce number of projects being undertaken.(Worse Before Better)
* Set up monitoring with flexibility
* Empower employees
* Consider creating informal skunk-work projects or other forms of think-tanks
Increase Value Capture (from your customers business)
* Gather and analyze data on customer's value proposition
* Identify needs or opportunity for aggressive innovation
* Guide functional management in aligning short term cost controls and long term
strategy
* Ensure high level of responsiveness to customer and competition
Communicate big picture goals to all stakeholders
* Set and articulate a clear vision
* Create line-of-sight view to company vision and goals
* Communicate frequently and openly
* Align incentives to goals (global as well as long term)
* Have everyone move in the same direction
CHAPTER 7 - DOES THE LEGACY OF SUCCESS AND MARKET DOMINANCE
HELP OR HINDER FURTHER INNOVATIVE SUCCESS?
Responses to questions about the legacy of success can be subjective. However, there was a
general sense of agreement among the original AccuMap developers and others on some of the
common issues. The main observation is that success comes from the collective skills used to address
a particular problem or industry challenge. Future success means being able to use those skills, or a
modified version of those skills to address a different problem or adapt to a different social situation.
Failure comes from not paying adequate attention to what those skills are and how they need to be
harnessed in the new environment.
Below we look at examples of where skills, which contribute to innovation, were transferred over
effectively to new tasks or similar tasks in a new environment. In each situation there are still gaps
between the skills needed and the adaptations that have been made to address these needs.
* Assimilating acquisitions well
* Promoting an outsourcing attitude among developers
* Optimizing the use of the underlying architecture
* Aligning processes and tools based on needs
* Creating an urgent need for innovation as competitors catch-up
* Addressing cultural differences allows more focus on innovation
7.1 ASSIMILATING ACQUISITIONS WELL
IHS Inc. has made the acquisition of companies a key part of its growth strategy. One interviewee
explained that the company is trying to mould the organization to be able to assimilate these
acquisitions quicker than they have done in the past. US managers acknowledged that IHS Energy
Canada has done a remarkable job of integrating their acquisitions. These acquisitions have been
mostly content based and have been with companies that IHS Energy Canada has an existing proven
relationship or partnership. However, their skill in leveraging these strong data vendor relationships
means the group has established some due diligence norms, formal or informal, which allow it to
complete successful acquisitions. This is a perfect example of where early success can help the
company continue to innovate, though effectively acquiring and assimilation the organizations which
it determines to be essential to its produce development strategy.
We previously discussed why it is difficult for the large acquiring company to embrace and learn
from the successes of the acquired company, for example leveraging some of the Canadian
knowledge on how to assimilate acquisitions. It is partly due to the underlying attitude that 'The tail
can't wag the dog' when it comes to the small group influencing the much bigger one. However, an
attempt to learn from IHS Energy Canada's success in integrating its acquisitions might not only
leverage the proven skill sets within the company but, if successful, it might also accelerate the value
capture from strategic company investments
One interviewee believes that IHS Energy will never be a strong funder of R&D, "but it will
continue to acquire companies that have innovation and fit into their industry, that may be very
complimentary to the organization and grow a lot faster." Some believe that the company will start
stepping more into the service based aspect of business which is expected to be much tougher for the
company to integrate. According to one interviewee "We just don't have the width and breadth of
experience with the consulting component (of acquisitions). We have some limited experience but if
we are really going to grow in that space we are going to have to acquire a (lot of) companies who
are dominant in that space. It is going to require quite a commitment on the part of both companies to
take advantage of that integration right of the bat. You are going to look for companies that are going
to use our content to compliment their services that is where we are going to get best value."
In Robert Stringer's article on 'How to Manage Radical Innovation' California Management Review
2000,, he discusses how to stimulate innovation in large companies. In the article he considers
'working from the outside in' and he lists the reasons why most mergers, acquisitions and other
external alliances fail to generate an ongoing stream of commercial breakthroughs. Given the
emphasis on growth through acquisition at IHS Inc., it is worth considering what pitfalls exist when
it comes to acquiring innovation companies.
According to Stringer; "The innovation-hungry company usually saw itself as acquiring a new
product, rather than acquiring a new capability. Even when they realized that the radical innovation
involved more than a specific product, they did not know how to learn about the capabilities. Too
often, when this was the case, the acquisition or alliance created less, not more, innovation in the
core business."
"In addition to the failure to learn from the alliance or acquired partner, the stumbling block
frequently turned out to be the structure, culture and bureaucracy of the company desperate to
innovate. Time and again, promising new products or technologies proved to be too radical, too
threatening, or too different to be developed to their full commercial potential or to be leveraged
back into the company's base business."
"On occasion, the big company simply drove away the entrepreneurs and innovators by
attempting to guide, control, or influence the commercialization of their ideas. In other words,
innovating setting industry leaders looked outside but kept trying to bring the innovation inside.
Their focus on control and ownership of the innovations and the innovators, though appealing to the
large company mentality, not only did not produce the desired stream of new commercial successes,
it inhibited that stream by providing a false sense of progress."
7.2 PROMOTING AN OUTSOURCING ATTITUDE AMONG DEVELOPERS
AccuMap's successful approach of partnering with data suppliers from the very early days,
working with them to improve integration or delivery, meant there was always openness to outside
inventions and innovations. This approach of successful leveraging partners' technology led to a
number of successful acquisitions later on.
As one original AccuMap developer put it; "It doesn't matter if it's not invented here, we can
almost always buy it or license it or write it ourselves. It's simply a business decision based on time-
to-market and available resources or money," This view was echoed by others who felt there was
absolutely no resistance to outside innovations when it came to building technologies, creating
technical processes or integrating 3rd party technologies.
Technology adaptations such as building the data loaders or dedicated compression routines, or
adding new functionality were mainly done in-house. Sometimes adaptations required software
modifications on the partner's application to work in the AccuMap application. In the early days about
80% of the technical work was completed in-house compared to 20% completed by partners. In the
later days, there were a few partnerships where that ratio is flipped and AccuMap provided an
exclusive link to the partner's data website, from within the appropriate context of the AccuMap
application. In some cases data partners improved their technology and that increased speed of
delivery to AccuMap, or increased speed of partnered runtime data to the customer. Those changes
were not done solely for AccuMap, but AccuMap was usually more than ready to leverage those
benefits.
This approach, allowing developers to outsource all or part of their work, is one of the best ways
to establish and promote outsourcing practices. If, for example, developers are formally incentivized to
look outside to find cost efficient ways to complete product development through connecting with
other sources, then outsourcing becomes part of the culture, promoted from the bottom up instead of
dictated from the top down. If this approach to development were truly promoted it could greatly
reduce R&D costs in the long term.
This was the approach taken in Proctor & Gamble (P&G) as described in article 'Connect and
Develop' by Larry Huston and Nabil Sakkab, Harvard Business Review, March 2006,. According to
the abstract "By identifying promising ideas throughout the world and applying its own capabilities to
them, P&G realized it could create better and cheaper products, faster. Now, the company collaborates
with suppliers, competitors, scientists, entrepreneurs, and others (that's the connect part),
systematically scouring the world for proven technologies, packages, and products that P&G can
improve, scale up, and market (in other words, develop), either on its own or in partnership with other
companies. Thanks partly to this connect-and-develop approach R&D productivity at Procter and
Gamble has increased by nearly 60%".
7.3 OPTIMIZING THE USE OF THE UNDERLYING ARCHITECTURE
AccuMap primarily relied on customer feedback regarding what new data and functionality to
add. Developers believe that this had the benefit of keeping them focused on their core competency.
According to one former AccuMap developer "The model for much of the software/data
extension of functionality was fairly simple - what was the key information needed in the workflows
of each of our user types (geologist, engineer, land person, etc.).... We were extending a known
success formula and had lots of extension work to do. These adaptations were a close reflection of
the demand coming from our customer base for data and functionality lacking at the time."
As predicted by Moore's law, there was a doubling of processor speed and hard drive space
approximately every 18 months. (In 1965 Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, predicted that
transistor density on a silicon integrated circuit would double every 18 months. This became known
as Moore's Law, ). AccuMap's strong underlying architecture allowed them to quickly add more
functions, write more robust and capable software and add significantly more data by utilizing
greater amounts of RAM (Random Access Memory). Competitors failed to capitalize on these
opportunities.
As significant strides were made in software usability AccuMap was able to copy and implement
those changes readily. It was also able to take full advantage of improvements in software processes
such as source code control and quality processes. This helped AccuMap deliver better software
faster and with predictability and repeatability, without changing its core architecture.
According to the IHS Energy website "The vision for Enerdeq is to have all IHS commercial data
available through the Enerdeq platform and to provide the mix of applications and data access
methods that are appropriate for each of our varied markets and within your own company
environments" Figure 7.4 below shows the way in which Enerdeq uses its common platform and
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to meet an expanded set of customer needs and ultimately
provide high performance customized solutions via its web services. As mentioned in Chapter 5 one
fonnrmer AccuMap developer saw that "The shared (Enerdeq) goal has expanded since 2003. There is
even more consolidation than originally envisioned". When the developers began to see the overlap,
they realized how much of a difference they really could make if they shared the architecture.
Certain architectural designs are now being adopted to allow products to be shared more easily.
Clearly it was not just the developers from IHS Energy Canada who recognized the increasing
number of consolidation opportunities. This is an example of where skills from the early success
were naturally leveraged in promoting further innovative success.
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7.4 ALIGNING PROCESSES AND TOOLS BASED ON NEEDED
Most people agree that the main AccuMap development and commercial release process was very
robust and it hasn't changed much in over 10 years, although it has evolved in terms of QA, code-
reviews, beta builds, etc. as major adaptations were made. The last big development process change
took place in recent years in order to align it more closely with the tools and processes of the
Enerdeq team.
Most developers believe that this robust process is a core strength which can be aligned to
partners or other developer's processes where necessary to foster innovation. There is a recent move
to align all processes and tools for the sake of creating uniformity across all IHS worldwide IT
development groups. This would allow the company to achieve economies of scale by having a
smaller technology footprint. However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, one former AccuMap developer
believes that leading the integration of development groups means building "a deep understanding of
processes and technologies used by both development groups, with the goal of learning from each
group". Merging of process or technology should be considered, but alignment should only take
place where it makes sense. "Try not to merge or share just for the sake of it, it must benefit the
customer in some way."
In section 5.2 one developer was quoted as saying; "There is some flexibility and some
recognition of historic cultures in that groups don't have to change tools today." While others see
absolutely no flexibility in the plan to implement a common tool set, this is an example ofa .
leadership style which accommodates long term goals by acknowledging the pre-existing norms and
practices established within certain group. By allowing groups some flexibility in when they can
change tools, there is greater likelihood of getting them to identify with the adaptive process of
discarding old practices. This increases the buy-in to creating a smaller technology footprint.
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Success depends on being able to adapt to a new situation, keeping what is useful and dispose of
what is no longer required. Simple as the theory is, it is incredibly difficult to achieve as is reflected
in much of the literature. When it comes to innovation the key thing to focus on, according to many
case studies, is the process that created the successful product rather than the product itself. An
historical and scholarly view of innovation is given in the 1966 article 'Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study
of Innovation', from Elting E. Morison/ Men, Machines, and Modem Times, (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press), 1966. The study concludes that happiness and delight comes from identifying with the
adaptive process itself.
"Historically such identification with process as opposed to product, with adventurous selection
and adaptation as opposed to simple retention and possessiveness, has been difficult to achieve
collectively. The Roman of the early republic, the Italian of the late fifteenth and early Sixteenth
century, or the Englishman of Elizabeth's time appear to have been most successful in seizing the
new opportunities while conserving as much of the heritage of the past as he found relevant and
useful to his purpose.
We seem to have fallen on times similar to theirs, when many of the existing forms and schemes
have lost meaning in the face of dramatically altering circumstances. Like them we may find at least
part of our salvation in identifying ourselves with the adaptive process and thus share with them
some of the joy, exuberance, satisfaction, and security with which they went out to meet their
changing times."
7.5 CREATING AN URGENT NEED FOR INNOVATION AS COMPETITORS CATCH-UP
Success means paying attention to your environment. Customers have been looking for 'open'
data systems for many years now. An 'open' data system would allow customers to integrate third
party data or their own in-house data, data which gives them competitive advantage, into the
application. Being able to include in-house or third party content could really differentiate a product
but, to date no one has achieved an easy to install, high performance, fully integrated open system.
Competitors are catching up in other areas. AccuMap's main competitor since the mid 90's has
been GeoScout, whose content and functionality has begun to rival that of AccuMap, offering better
data sets and more functionality, specifically targeted at any apparent AccuMap weaknesses. Some
feel that GeoScout has surpassed AccuMap from the geologists' perspective in terms of functionality
needs, and others believe that additional content in GeoScout is responsible for some recent loss in
AccuMap's market share. Although engineering users still state a preference for AccuMap,
GeoScout is reportedly getting more new customers across the market. The two products currently
co-exist in some of the big companies, because the market is buoyant and companies can
accommodate preferences of different user groups. However, it would not take a significant shift for
a large company to decide to standardize and choose only one system, as some companies have done.
In such circumstances AccuMap could loose a foothold within some of its established large customer
base.
Given these facts it is surprising to hear people express the view that the competition appears to
have subsided recently, possibly because they still can't match the IHS Energy content. Some believe
that AccuMap still has momentum for a number of years simply because people are familiar with it
and don't necessarily want to switch yet. Others believe that changes in buyer patterns haven't been
seen yet due to the subscription nature of the business.
The IHS product development strategy, discussed in section 6.5 is very heavily reliant on the
concept that 'content is king' and theirs is best. Here the AccuMap success and IHS content
superiority provides a legacy of success and appears to remove any sense of urgency about the need
for aggressive innovation even though they are currently going through a major 'S-curve' product
transition.
7.6 ADDRESSING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES ALLOWS MORE FOCUS ON INNOVATION
Success for AccuMap meant attracting potential buyers, initially in 1998 being acquired by QC
Data's Petroleum division and then in 2001, by IHS Energy Canada. Since then a lot of the
innovative spirit appears to have gone into aggressively defending its culture. That feeling was
summed up in the comment "distance alone (from head office in Denver) has preserved some of the
good stuff."
Companies, like Cisco, who are highly successful in integrating acquisitions, agree that a cultural
match is one of the first things to be considered. Without it they will not proceed, no matter how
successful or profitable the potential acquisition is. It is clear from all those interviews that problems
related to cultural mismatch continue today within the global matrixed organization. Arguably if
developers are still addressing these issues they cannot be fully focused on the next generation
product. How these issues can be resolved is best addressed by those dealing with the situation day to
day, but all the functional managers have yet to buy into the need to do this. Promoting a culture of
'conflict and respect' could help to overcome the existing cultural barriers.
The optimum culture for an innovative organization is, according to MIT Sloan Professor
Rebecca Henderson, "high conflict and high respect, with an underlying long term commitment to
company goals". When the topic of conflict arose during interviews it was clear that there is no model
for dealing with conflict within IHS Energy and there was a sense that conflict was not often brought
into the open, particularly in the US offices. The Canadian office has a higher tolerance for conflict,
where developers and other employees are encouraged to challenge the status quo, as it relates to
company goals. In order for conflict to be constructive, people need to be held accountable for their
work so that conflict does not become a vehicle for obstruction or an end in itself. In the global IT
organization conflict has not been dealt with well. Many agreed that serious underlying conflict
relating to integration issues went on much longer than it should have.
Rather than personalize any of the conflicts it is helpful to look at them solely in terms of work or
critical tasks being done and see what barriers are being created by not openly addressing the
opposing views. Going forward there is an opportunity to embrace conflict as a way of highlighting
where immediate dialog needs to occur, so that the opposing groups or individuals can come up with
an agreed definition of the 'work' to be done or the critical tasks that need to be addressed. The
challenge is to adapt the definition of the work so that all stakeholders embrace it.
In 'Leadership Without Easy Answers,' Harvard's Professor Ronald Heifetz, looks at the
importance of letting conflict emerge and the benefits of taking an adaptive rather than a control
approach in managing a period of transition where conflict and disequilibrium occur. In a chapter
entitled 'On a Razor's Edge' Heiftez discusses the need for leadership to maintain balance on the edge
between developing and quelling conflict. Figure 7.2 shows a modified table showing the different
outcomes that result in shifting from a control style to an adaptive style of leadership in different
business or social situations.
Leadership with Authority (e.g. Manager) in Adaptive Situations
Business or Social function Leadership Approach (or Situational type)
Control (or Technical) Adaptive
Direction
Protection
Role Orientation
Controlling conflict
Norm maintenance
Leader provides problem
definition and solution
Leader protects from external
threat
Leader orients
Leader restores order
Leader maintains norms
Leader identifies the adaptive
challenge, provides diagnosis
of conditions and produces
questions about problem
definition and solutions
Leader discloses external
threat
Leader disorients current
roles or resists pressure to
orient people in new roles too
quickly
Leader exposes conflict or
lets it emerge
Leader challenges norms or
allows them to be challenged
"Leadership Without Easy Answers" Ronald A. Heifetz, 1994.
Figure 7.2
According to Heifetz; "Exercising leadership from a position of authority in adaptive situations
means going against the grain. Rather than fulfilling the expectation for answers, one provides
questions; rather than protecting people from outside threat, one lets people feel the threat in order to
stimulate adaptation; instead of orienting people to their current roles, one disorients people so that
new role relationships develop; rather than quelling conflict, one generates it; instead of maintaining
norms, one challenges them."
"Of course, real life is fluid. An Authority figure, even in adaptive situations will act differently
to fulfill each of these social functions depending on several factors, as just mentioned: the severity
of the problem, the resilience of the social system, the ripeness of the issue, and time. For example,
in an organization one may have to act firmly to maintain norms and restore clear role assignments,
while challenging people with questions and raising conflict about direction. But to make tactical
decisions to move between technical and adaptive modes along each of these five dimensions, one
first needs a clear conception of the differences." (The five dimensions are shown in Figure 7.2
above.)
Conflict needs to be addressed by someone with decision making authority. Within the global IT
group the command and control approach to decision making seems to be used most frequently.
According to the sentiments expressed in this research this has proven to be effective only in adding
resistance in the last three years. It is my belief that practicing an adaptive leadership style would
allow both conflict and respect to co-exist in a way that would break down barriers and promote
more creativity and innovativeness, which would increase productivity among the development
community.
CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW THE COMPANY
CAN BECOME MORE INNOVATIVE
In the previous chapters we looked at problems facing IHS Inc., specifically relating to its ability
to develop innovative data access and integration products, as it strives to be the global standard for
enabling the best-in-class decision making processes in the oil and gas industry. We compared their
innovation, leadership and cultural problems to problems of a similar nature, described in the
literature or relevant case studies. We considered some barriers that exist due to previous innovation
success, combined with the problems of being a modem day public company driven by investor
expectations.
There are some strong recurring themes and the ten most significant themes are listed below. It is
the combination of issues which coincide at IHS Energy that create the ongoing challenging
situation. No single theme or observation holds prominence over the others as representing the issues
that most need to be addressed. However I have listed them according to my interpretation of their
potential impact on the company's ability to become more innovative in the future. There is no silver
bullet. All these issues require attention.
1. Assimilating acquisitions and utilizing their R&D
In my opinion, making strategic acquisitions and assimilating those acquisitions will continue to
have significant impact on the company's ability to become more innovative, for the reasons
described in section 7.1. Given the emphasis on growth through acquisition at IHS Inc., it is worth
considering what pitfalls exist when acquiring innovation companies. Clearly, IHS Inc. is not yet
fully proficient in learning about the capabilities of the acquired company. According to Stringer's
article few acquiring companies have developed these skills. In the case of IHS Inc there appears to
be little interest or focus on finding acquisitions with a cultural fit, or leveraging the R&D skills or
capabilities so innovation is more likely to slow down rather than improve. Geographical cultural
differences definitely added to the challenges in assimilating the Canadian companies. The words of
one executive manager at IHS Inc., 'The tail can't wag the dog,' summed up the willingness of the
executive team to learn from its smaller successful groups. Yet IHS Energy Canada is acknowledged
as having done a remarkable job of integrating its acquisitions. This is a prime example of where IHS
has failed to learn about the full capabilities of one of its acquired company.
2. Understanding Emergent versus Deliberate Strategy
The most practical way in which IHS Energy can begin to consider its innovation problems today is
by examining its emergent versus deliberate strategy as referenced in section 6.5. The aggregate
project planning process, as referenced by Clayton M. Christensen in relation to this case is a good
tool to help examine where and how resources are actually being used. The Enerdeq product, as it
performs today reflects IHS Energy's emergent strategy. If this is where the company wishes to be in
terms of performance, innovativeness and speed to market, then the strategy is fine. If the company
has a desire to be more innovative in the data access and integration solutions it provides to its
customers, then it needs to look more carefully at how the resources are being deployed and what
people are actually choosing to prioritize. A strategy seldom works on its own. In the case of IHS it
needs to be accompanied, amongst other things, by hiring and retention practices that actively
support R&D growth.
3. Creating and articulating the vision
Most of the core group of interviewees agreed that there has been lack of clarity and motivation
around global goals. This has resulted in lack of focus on resource related issues, particularly when it
comes to innovation, as discussed in section 3.2. The decision to invest in R&D resources or not
depends on how serious IHS Inc. is about creating innovative solutions for data access and
integration products. Given its market dominance today, it is likely to be a major player in the oil and
gas industry for some time to come. However, if the company wishes to become more innovative,
that intention needs to be clearly defined as part of the deliberate company strategy and in turn needs
to be linked to the company vision. Currently it is not. Articulating a vision which inspires
innovation and creativity is essential. Today, none of the core interviewees see this company as an
innovative one. There is a strong sense of optimism that the new CEO at IHS, Jerre Stead, will do
much more than provide great rhetoric when it comes to supporting new product innovation at IHS.
4. Deploying a low cost strategic business model
IHS Inc can become more innovative, even using a low cost business development model, but to do
this, it must address and pay close attention to, all of the other issues or themes summarized in the
list. The constant and singular focus on cutting costs puts the company at risk of tipping into a
firefighting mode, as described in section 5.3, because it is fueling an increase in employee turnover.
I believe that people need to understand the cost cutting imperatives in the context of the bigger
picture. For example, all interviewees sought more understanding of how to interpret global goals in
the context of local or regional priorities. My recommendation is, to address the five issues relating
to communicating the big picture goals, to all stakeholders as described in section 6.7.
5. Understanding 'Worse Before Better'
As with all change it takes time and effort to implement. With a product innovation cycle this means
investing time and money in getting all the loops in the cycle working effectively, as described in the
system dynamics diagram in Figure 5.2.and in section 5.2. Things get worse before they get better
when significant transition is undertaken, as has happened at IHS. The company needs to invest more
to get beyond the 'Worse Before Better' cycle or it is at risk of tipping into constant firefighting
mode as described above and in section 5.3. To mitigate this risk, IHS needs to empower functional
managers, including product and project managers to make informed decisions so they are not
operating in a crisis mode for extended periods. Each of the observations listed in section 5.6, relate
to the issues raised regarding the transition to the global matrixed organization. As these are the
issues that the people feel strongest about, in my view, these are the ones that need to be addressed.
6. Managing the tension between short and long term strategy
This is a management or executive skill which requires constant adaptation to changing business
conditions. Functional managers look to the executives for guidance in this matter. All core
interviewees felt that the emphasis at IHS Inc is given to short term cost cutting goals as discussed in
section 6.4 and other sections. The right people skills exist in IHS to foster innovation, but these are
constantly being eroded by turnover due to increasing focus on short term profits with little or no
visibility on long term strategy. For the company to increase its innovation over time, this balance
has to shift. People need to feel empowered to create, prioritize and act on long term goals. Their
rewards and recognition need to be tied to such goals. If innovation is not part of the clearly
articulated long term goals, then it won't really happen. The company must invest in innovation by
setting a deliberate product development strategy that reflects the vision of being more innovative.
Then it must follow through on that strategy.
7. Addressing culture and conflict
All those interviewed believed that the leadership at IHS needs to pay more attention to
understanding and accommodating the differences in culture, because the associated problems have
become amplified in the integrated IT groups. In sections 3.5, 6.2 and 7.6 the cultural issues are
discussed in detail. I referred to MIT Professor Rebecca Henderson's belief that "high conflict and
high respect, with an underlying long term commitment to company goals" is the optimal culture in
technology innovation companies. As I concluded in section 7.6, conflict needs to be addressed by
someone with decision making authority. Within the global IT group the command and control
approach to decision making seems to be used most frequently. According to the sentiments
expressed in this research, this has proven to be effective only in adding resistance in the last three
years. It is my belief that practicing an adaptive leadership style, as described by Ronald Heifetz in
'Leadership Without Easy Answers' , would allow both conflict and respect to co-exist in a way that
would break down barriers and promote more creativity and innovativeness. This would in-turn
increase productivity in the product development community.
8. Creating a sense of urgency around innovation
In sections 6.3 and 7.5 we discussed how heavily reliant IHS is on the strongly held belief that
'content is king' and that IHS content is best. While this is true, the company's highly valued
historical data (pre 1970's) could become less of a competitive advantage as customs and
competitors build and acquire more data sets themselves. In my view the AccuMap product success
and the IHS content superiority provides a legacy of success. This appears to remove any sense of
urgency about the need for aggressive innovation, even though the company is going through a major
product transition. The only urgency is to replace the current product in the shortest time possible.
Employees need to have a strong sense of urgency and excitement around creating new products.
Section 6.7 summarizes the issues needed to maintain an efficient and cost effective product
development processes. These need to be addressed with an emphasis on creating informal skunk-
works projects or other forms of think-tanks to give visible commitment to the long term need for
innovative product development.
9. Promoting an outsourcing attitude among developers
If developers are formally incentivised to connect with other innovation sources, by looking outside
the company to find cost efficient ways to complete product development, then outsourcing becomes
part of the company's innovation culture (as discussed in section 7.2). Proctor & Gamble increased
their productivity by nearly 60% using this approach, . IHS has been aggressively investigating
outsourcing options for IT for some time. In my view, if outsourcing was promoted from the bottom
up, instead of just imposed from the top down, then the company could reduce R&D costs and
become a lot more innovative in the long term.
10. Aligning processes and tools based on needs
Section 7.4 looks at how success depends on being able to adapt to a new situation, keeping what is
useful and disposing of what is no longer required. Today IHS strives to create a smaller technology
footprint by establishing a common set of tools across the corporation. In my view, by allowing
groups some flexibility in aligning their processes and tools, there is greater likelihood of getting
them to identify with the adaptive process of discarding old practices to make way for the new.
Given that IHS will extend the use of this common tool set as it acquires other profitable and creative
companies, it will need to assimilate their capabilities in a more effective way. Empowering IT
developers to align their processes and tools on an 'as needs basis', is likely to result in the retention
of more innovative capabilities as they integrate into the formidable IHS organization.
APPENDIX 1
1.0 What were the essential components of AccuMap's breakthrough innovation success?
1.1 To what extent was the initial AccuMap business plan based on the commercial opportunity
versus identifying a potential breakthrough technology
1.2 What was the technology opportunity which AccuMap captured over its competitors?
1.3 What early benchmarking (if any) was done of the new technology versus industry tools?
1.4 How did AccuMap capture and maintain first mover advantage in the market?
1.5 What difficulties d
1.6 id AccuMap face when launching itself in the marketplace?
1.7 What were the major technical adaptations that took place within the AccuMap product since
1991 ?(e.g. platform evolution, integration of datasets, etc )
1.8 What accompanying cultural adaptations were necessary? How were they implemented?
1.9 How flexible was the company in adapting its strategy or product technology?
1.10 To what extent were subsequent technology adaptations or changes completed in-house
versus in collaboration with partners?
1.11 How did AccuMap gain investor confidence? On what basis were returns guaranteed
(customer commitment, niche market potential, and exit strategy)?
2.0 How do Leadership styles and values impact a company's ability to create radically
innovative products?
2.1 Did the early leader of AccuMap know where he was going (what he was doing)?
2.2 Did he change his mind? Did he adapt to the changing environment?
2.3 After the founder left, did the subsequent executive leader know where he was going?
2.4 Did he change his mind? Did he adapt to the changing environment?
2.5 What attributes are necessary to lead the company when it is pioneering a technology
breakthrough and /or new innovation?
2.6 What attributes are necessary to lead the company when it is sustaining its technology
advantage in order to increase performance?
2.7 What attributes are necessary to lead the integration of technology development groups in a
merged organization?
2.8 Which of the attributes in the above three questions is most relevant today?
3.0 How does the legacy of success help or hinder further innovative success?
3.1 Since the early 90's what other technology developments have had significant impact on the
market in which AccuMap has been the dominant player.
3.2 Who played the lead roles (e.g. gatekeepers etc) in identifying and assessing relevant industry
technology developments?
3.3 What related industry innovations or advances were missed (if any) and why?
3.4 To what extent are there barriers to innovations which are 'not-invented-here'?
3.5 How much of the original development process is still in place versus how much has been
adapted to capture the changing technology landscape?
3.6 When and how did the competition begin to capture market share (from perspective of
advances in innovation)?
4.0 What technical and cultural adaptations were needed to integrate the AccuMap
product into the Enerdeq product platform?
4.1 What major technology integration and changes had to take place within the merged
development organizations (e.g. platform, tools etc)? Who facilitated this?
4.2 What differences existed in the way innovative success was promoted, managed and
rewarded?
4.3 What were the expected and unexpected barriers to integration?
4.4 What were the commonly understood goals of the merged development organization?
4.5 What (cultural and technical) losses did each development group experience and how were
these losses managed?
4.6 Which of the development cultures prevailed? Who leads versus contributes? Why?
5.0 What lessons has IHS Energy learned in moving from a regional BU controlled
software development function, to global, functionally controlled BU's within a global
matrix organization (e.g. what has the company gained/lost?)
5.1 How much of the company's technical innovation is driven by the need for business growth
versus changing customer segmentation needs versus changes in innovative landscape?
5.2 What new markets (or needs of top segmented customers) are being served by 'Enerdeq'
which were not being served by AccuMap?
5.3 fHow effective are the new functionally controlled business units in translating customer
needs to innovation requirements? What and where are the gaps
5.4 What losses did the various business units experience (with respect to their strategic role and
cultural). How were these losses managed?
5.5 What aspects (if any) of a pioneering culture have been maintained in the matrix structured
organization? Why have they succeeded and how do they continue to add value?
6.0 What are the company's current barriers to innovation (in product development) (e.g.
leadership, culture, financial performance, etc)?
6.1 Does the leader clearly understand the company's innovation strategy? How well does he
communicate this?
6.2 How does he adapt the strategy to changing environment (e.g. vision and values, sustained
R&D funding, non-operational financial performance metrics, etc)
6.3 Is IHS Energy adapting its development strategy to incorporate the next generation needs of
its customers? How effectively is strategy deployment?
6.4 To what extent are IHS Energy's sustaining innovations threatened by new disruptive
innovations from new market entrants or collaborative ventures?
6.5 What barriers do competitors face in entering this arena?
6.6 What commitments (financial and otherwise) has IHS Energy made in order to enter the
industry's emerging markets? How does this compare to the competition?
6.7 When conflicts of interest are identified how does IHS Energy manage these, externally with
complementors and internal with business units?
6.8 How adaptable and effective is the structure in mitigating these conflicts?
7.0 How does the company become more innovative and develop more new high quality
products faster?
7.1 Is IHS Energy a technology platform leader? If not, does it aspire to be one?
7.2 Who are its complementors and how open are the interfaces?
7.3 To what extent is use of open innovation (external development groups) encouraged?
7.4 How has IHS Energy captured the lessons learned from product development delays, staff
turnover, or loss of existing market share?
7.5 What capabilities does the company need to acquire or develop?
7.6 What vision for market leadership does IHS Energy have with regard to its product? and
innovation vision for development strategy adapted to meet the changes in
7.7 What markets does IHS Energy want to capture?
NOTES:
Questions 1.1, 1.3, 1.8 & 1.10 are based on the evaluation of software start-ups, 'The
Business of Software', Michael A. Cusumano, 2004,.
Questions 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 are based on Clayton M. Christensen, insights into how great firms
can fail from 'Innovator's Dilemma' 2002,.
Question 7.1 and 7.2 are based on work of Michael A. Cusumano & Annabelle Gawer,
'Elements of Platform leadership' (SMR Spring 2002, vol. 43, no. 3),.
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